

CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
PROVISIONAL TREATY
WITH
AMERICA,
AND THE
PRELIMINARY ARTICLES
OF
PEACE
WITH
FRANCE AND SPAIN.

L O N D O N :

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND.

M.DCC.LXXXIII.

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LONDON:
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MILNERS

CONSIDERATIONS,

&c.

WHO ever hath made any observations on the state of the world, cannot avoid being sensible of the various and discordant opinions which are formed concerning almost every subject that comes under human consideration. This diversity of sentiment does not extend only to the speculative and abstruse matters of enquiry that engage the attention of the philosopher and the metaphysician, but to those practical questions which, it might be imagined, would easily be determined by the plain dictates of common sense and general experience. So different are the views in which the same things present themselves to different

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minds,

minds, that there is nothing in the ordinary course of life, nothing with regard to agriculture, and manufactures, commerce and politics, but what has been debated, and will continue to be debated, by men of the best understandings and the most upright dispositions.

SUCH being the nature of man, there is the less reason to be surprised at the opposite opinions that are entertained concerning the Provisional Treaty with America, and the Preliminary Articles with France and Spain: and yet when we reflect on the fatal condition to which the nation was reduced, and on the conviction that prevailed of the necessity of being extricated from it, almost at any rate, it might have been hoped that the terms on which Peace has been obtained, would have excited far less dissatisfaction than they appear to have done. That those who reaped benefit from the prosecution of the war, should be averse to

its discontinuance, might naturally be expected. Neither can it be deemed strange that the violent advocates for the impolitic and destructive measures so long pursued, should be displeased with an event so contrary to their views and their wishes. But that those who execrated the American War, who, at least, thought it the height of infatuation, and who, perhaps, regarded it as founded on injustice; that such men should now be the first to condemn the peace, and even ardent to plunge the nation into confusion on account of it, can only be imputed to a most rapid and unaccountable change of sentiments, or to motives far less honourable and praise-worthy.

It does not require many arguments to prove, that the happiest circumstance which could possibly take place for the general interests of mankind, would be for the nations of the earth to subsist together in a mutual agreement. Peace is

the state in which the mind can exert its finest energies, and rise to the greatest improvements. It is only in a state of peace that the necessary, the useful, and the elegant arts of life, can be exercised in complete security, and carried on to their full perfection. That, too, is the time for science and knowledge, literature and taste, to be cultivated in their highest degrees, and for all those noble designs to be planned and executed, which shall contribute, in the most effectual manner, to the public welfare.

A state of war, on the contrary, is replete with accumulated evils. The calamities it introduces, in the ruin of property, the distress of private families, the destruction of towns, and the slaughter of the human race, are beyond expression. Nor are the miseries it is fraught with confined to those countries alone, which are the immediate scenes of the hostilities and devastations carried
on

on by the contending powers. The nation engaged in war, though its desolations are at a distance from the principal seat of government, will still experience the direful effects of it, in the loss of many useful citizens, in the decline of trade, in the sinking value of lands, in the increase of burthens and taxes, and in that enervation of strength, which, if it be not followed by the absolute decline and fall of a kingdom, may require a long time to repair.

BUT consonant as these reflections are to the dictates of reason, and the feelings of humanity, I have no intention to enlarge upon them; because I am satisfied that they will have little effect upon the mind of the hard-hearted politician. Besides, however desirable Peace may be in itself, such is the state of human affairs, that it cannot be always preserved. It will frequently be interrupted by the clashing interests of public communities, and

and by the ambition, injustice, and other evil passions of the governing part of mankind. War is sometimes unavoidable, sometimes just, sometimes honourable; and there are cases in which its effects are highly advantageous, whatever be the immediate calamities with which it is attended. It is, therefore, more to my purpose to enquire whether the Treaties lately agreed upon, were not executed at a time in which Peace was peculiarly necessary to this country.

Now, in order to have a full conviction of the matter, it will be requisite to look back to the course of events, and to the political management of the affairs of Great Britain, for some years past. In making this retrospect, so many objects present themselves to the imagination, that the mind can scarcely know on what to fix its first attention; and the review is as unpleasant as it is copious and extensive. In a very short space of time, a
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nation that stood eminently high in honour and prosperity, which was the envy and glory of the world, hath been reduced to a situation so humiliating and distressful, that no lover of his country can reflect upon it without the most painful sensations. Nor is it easy to find an instance of such a rapid decline in the records of mankind ; I mean of such a rapid decline, where there have been none of those sudden conquests of which ancient history affords some striking examples. It is not by any extraordinary or unavoidable attacks that Great Britain has been reduced to so unfortunate a situation ; but by a series of measures, which, to say the least of them, were so diametrically opposite to the most obvious dictates of common sense, and the plainest rules of policy, that it is scarcely possibly to think of them without astonishment. What aggravates the reflection upon them is, that when the fatal consequences of our quarrel with the

American Colonies were in full prospect, when a civil war in that Continent hung over us, when the warning voice of a Chatham called us to suspend our hand, we had not wisdom to stop in the career of madness, though an admirable opportunity was afforded us for the restoration of tranquillity, and the recovery of our former prosperous condition. My readers will easily perceive that I advert to the rejection of Mr. Penn's petition, which hath so often been mentioned, and which will continue to force itself upon our recollection, and to excite the feelings of the utmost regret and indignation.

ALL the other measures pursued in this contest were equally replete with folly ; and the result of them was such as might naturally be expected, and was often foretold. Besides the immense difficulty and expence of carrying on the dispute with the Colonies, we had to contend
with

with a most formidable confederacy of our European enemies. France, and Spain, and Holland, became, in the course of the war, united with America, to reduce the power and humble the pride of Britain.

It is not to the wrong principles and bad policy of our rulers alone, that the unhappy condition of this country is to be ascribed. Part, at least, of the blame must light on the nation in general. There was a time, as Lord Camden justly observed, when the American War was popular. The arrogance of the people, nourished by former victories and prosperity, and accompanied with an unreasonable contempt of the adversaries against whom we were engaged, hath greatly contributed to our present humiliation. Many encouraged the contest, and others looked upon it with a supine indifference. Had public bodies of men more generally interfered, had the country

try gentlemen been sooner awakened, had the principal merchants vigorously interposed, a wiser policy might have taken place, and many evils have been prevented. But through interested or mistaken views, the measures of our governors received too much acquiescence and support.

I AM not insensible that a very respectable part of the nation entertained juster sentiments of things. There were not wanting many able men, both in and out of parliament, who would have called us back to wisdom and to recollection. The soundest reasonings, and the strongest eloquence, were employed to this purpose, but without effect. We still ran the race of folly and madness, and flattered ourselves with the attainment of our wishes, though our operations in America were, from year to year, either ineffectual or unfortunate, though we were plunging deeper and deeper into
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accumulated embarrassments, though our West-India Islands and other valuable possessions abroad were wrested from us, though our very domestic security was threatened, though our burthens were amazingly increased, though the resources of taxation were almost exhausted, and though the reduction of the Colonies became every day more and more impracticable and hopeless.

A FULL display of the late political conduct of Great Britain, and of the effects which have resulted from it, is beyond the purpose of the present writer. It must be left to the philosophical historian of another age, to trace, at large, the principles and causes, the events and consequences of the mighty but unhappy contest in which we have been engaged. I only call a few facts to memory, that it may more clearly be discerned how necessary it was, upon any tolerable terms, to be rescued from the continuance of a dangerous and destructive war.

INDEED, the nation was at length roused from its lethargy. Those who had long resisted the strongest arguments, began, at last, to see that the condition of the public would be desperate, if the measures which had plunged us into so many calamities should be continued. They became sensible that the kingdom could not struggle for ever against such repeated disappointments, such accumulating taxes, such a powerful combination of enemies. The surrender of Lord Cornwallis and his army, dispelled the delusion which yet remained upon the minds of numbers who had not hitherto been affected by a series of unfavourable events, and by all the exertions of reason and eloquence. Even those Country Gentlemen who had been the most distinguished for their attachment to *Tory* principles, and who had placed the greatest confidence in Administration, gave up the contest as hopeless. In spite of all the efforts of the men in power,

it was resolved, that an offensive war should no longer be carried on in America; and after such a resolution, it was not possible for the Ministry to maintain their ground. The voice of Parliament, the voice of the people called for their dismissal; and those men were invited to take the conduct of affairs, who had long, without effect, reprobated the measures of their predecessors in office. The change was one of the greatest that hath happened in our time, and it was rendered particularly pleasing by its introducing into Government an extensive union of the first abilities with the best dispositions. Into the circumstances which in some measure broke this union, it is not my present business to enquire. Whilst I look back upon them with regret, I have, at the same time, the consolation of reflecting, that a number of the ablest men were still left in Administration, from whose known principles and characters there was cause to expect,

that

that whatever could be done would be endeavoured to rescue the nation from its distresses, and especially to obtain for it the blessing of peace. They had every reason to make this the first and prime object of their attention; being called to it by great general views, as well as by a multitude of particular considerations.

ONE principal end that our Statesmen had undoubtedly in prospect, was to break the grand combination which had been formed against Britain. This was a matter of the highest consequence to the salvation and welfare of the kingdom. The continuance of the confederacy, if it should be strengthened by our pride and obstinacy in refusing reasonable concessions, might have been productive of the most fatal effects. Whereas if it could once be dissolved, prudent steps might be taken to prevent such a league against us in future;

ture; and, by framing new alliances, never again to be reduced to the wretched condition of scarcely having a single power that we could call our friend.

ANOTHER important object must have been to give the nation the opportunity of recovering its strength, that it might be prepared for a fresh contest, if, in the course of things, disputes should again arise between this country and its ancient enemies. It may be hoped and believed, that hostilities will not soon be revived; and much will depend, for the prolongation of peace, on the wisdom, policy, and vigour with which our public affairs are conducted. At any rate it was of the utmost consequence to obtain a space for lessening the enormous expences of the nation, and for repairing, as far as possible, the losses we had sustained. It would surely have been very unwise to have continued the war till our finances were totally

tally exhausted. It is a bad time for negociation, when a kingdom is come to the end of its resources. That is not the time for treating with an enemy upon terms which are tolerably advantageous. Indeed, the season of negociation had already been delayed far too long: for the accumulated public debt, the millions to be funded, the millions to be raised by way of supply, called aloud that there was not a moment to be lost in putting an end to the war. Indeed, when we consider that the support of the peace establishment will be as much as the nation can well bear, and that it will require all the wisdom, and all the integrity of our Rulers to put it upon such a footing as shall allow room for the recovery of our strength, we must be convinced that this was not the time for the protraction of hostilities.

THESE general reasons for coming, as speedily as possible, to a treaty with our

numerous and formidable enemies, were strengthened by the calamity of a severe and unfruitful season. Such was the failure of the harvest, that two important objects of revenue, the malt tax and the duty on hops, must necessarily be uncommonly defective; and the poor are threatened with a scarcity which, it is to be feared, may amount to little less than a famine, before the return of Autumn. Perhaps nothing but the supply of grain which the peace may enable us to draw from America could effectually prevent so awful an event. Who knows what might have been the consequences of war and famine united? To take, therefore, every method to avoid the junction of two such dreadful evils, can only be ascribed to a policy equally judicious and humane.

THE state of things being such as we have represented it, it was an act of necessity, as well as wisdom, in our

Governors, to apply their utmost efforts to obtain for the nation the blessing of peace. This blessing they have, in fact, obtained ; and considering the situation of the public, and the immense difficulties which must attend so complicated a negociation, they have succeeded in their attempt sooner than might reasonably have been expected. At the same time I do from my heart declare, that I esteem the Ministry to be highly deserving of applause, for agreeing to Treaties so comparatively salutary and beneficial.

THE writer of this Tract may not, perhaps, have many who agree with him in opinion, but he cannot help saying, that he thinks a peace would have been worthily obtained, even if it had been purchased at the expence of the cession of Gibraltar. The giving up of that fortress for a valuable equivalent, if the circumstances of the times had called
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for it, might have been shewn to be no unsound act of policy. Besides saving an immense expence, and that too for an object now become comparatively insignificant, I mean our commerce in the Mediterranean, it might have tended to weaken the family compact, to produce a firm union between Great-Britain and Spain, and to procure for us superior advantages in other parts of the world. Some of the most capable judges do not entertain a high opinion of the importance of Gibraltar; and persons might be named, even from among such as have signally contributed to its defence; who do not regard it as a reasonable object of English idolatry.

ON this matter there is, however, no occasion to enlarge, as the Spaniards have not been hearkened to in their demands for the cession of that fortress; nor is there any ground to imagine that a future cession of it was within the con-

templation of the Ministry. They wisely yielded to the voice of the people, whether that voice was judicious or not, and on that account are entitled to commendation.

BUT though the pride of the nation hath been gratified in this respect, and a treaty hath been made without the surrender of Gibraltar, there is still heard, though not among the people in general, the language of dissatisfaction and complaint. Indeed, whilst the opinions of men are so various, whilst their interests are so discordant, and, above all, whilst we are divided into so many parties and factions, who have more their own ends in view than the common good, it was to be expected that the terms of pacification would, in every possible point of view, be severely attacked. It is difficult, at any time, to give universal satisfaction to the people of England with regard to a peace. It would be
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difficult to do it at junctures the most favourable for procuring advantageous stipulations, and much more so at the present unfortunate crisis. Though to snatch us from the jaws of destruction was all that the ablest politician could hope for, the pride of Britons was still crying aloud for *an honourable peace*; and an honourable peace was undoubtedly the ardent wish of every lover of his country. But it was to be remembered, that the word honourable is a relative term: What is not honourable at one period, may become so at another: What at one time it is honourable to demand, at another time it may be honourable to yield. The point to be considered is the ground we stood upon during the negotiation of 1782. The state of the kingdom was far, far different from what it was when the Treaty of Paris was concluded. We had then been victorious in every part of the globe. We stood above all the nations

nations of Europe in wealth, commerce, and power ; our resources, though they had been deeply tried, were by no means exhausted ; and France and Spain were at our feet. But our situation, at the time when the Provisional and Preliminary Articles were in agitation, was directly the reverse. Weakened, humbled, and standing on the brink of ruin, Safety not Glory was the principal object to which the attention of our Statesmen must necessarily be directed : and considering how differently we were circumstanced from what we were in 1762, I cannot help regarding it as greatly to the credit of our negociators, that the late Treaties with France and Spain should comparatively vary so little from that of Paris. Keeping in view the dreadful crisis of our affairs, I scruple not to assert, that the peace, which hath delivered this country from the most pressing dangers, and placed it in the condition of becoming, in the exercise
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of wisdom, œconomy, and public virtue, once more respectable, flourishing, and happy, is, putting America out of the question, not only an advantageous, but an honourable peace.

RESERVING some other observations on the subject, which will still farther contribute to place it in the clearest light, I shall proceed to a brief examination of the Treaties lately agreed upon; beginning with the American Articles, the signing of which was first in order of time, and the consideration of which is naturally the first in the order of our affections.

BUT previously to the discussion of the particular stipulations, it will be proper to make a general remark concerning the importance which there was of coming as speedily as possible to an accommodation with America. It was necessary to improve the season of reconciliation, whilst
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it was yet practicable to produce the return of a sincere and lasting friendship. A disposition to it was still prevalent in the minds of many of the Americans, and particularly of those who had long been in the habits of connection with this country, who were formed upon its manners, who, perhaps, had visited it in person, and who had in it a variety of acquaintance whose esteem and regard they wished to retain. But these men, who were most of them either middle-aged, or in the decline of life, were continually decreasing in number; whilst a younger race were springing up, who knew little of England, but from the hostilities it had exercised against them, and who would have been taught to view her only with the eye of execration and horror. Their prejudices and their hatred would in time have taken such deep root, that their attention would entirely have been turned to France: With her they would principally

pally have united in commerce, interest, and affection ; her customs they would have adopted ; her mode of education they would have imitated ; with her they would have been bound in a firm alliance ; and might powerfully have aided her in her hostile designs against Britain, especially in the western part of the world. Surely, it was the business of a wise politician to seize the moment of conciliation, and to prevent the establishment of an union which might have been followed by such fatal effects. It is a remarkable fact, and a fact but little known in this country, that the Americans had it in contemplation to have a book composed, containing a distinct and separate history of the sufferings their people had endured ; which book was to be made use of in the instruction of their children, to inspire them with a lasting sense of the calamities their forefathers had experienced.

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Such an institution would have continued an evil spirit for ages, and might for ever have prevented a coalition of interests, and the recovery of a real and durable affection. But since the cessation of hostilities, and the acknowledgment of the Independency of the United States, the design has been wholly laid aside; and I trust that no circumstance will hereafter occur, which shall occasion farther animosities. Mutual friendship and harmony will again take place, though the full restoration of them must be the work of time and prudence. A remembrance of past sufferings will indeed still remain, and probably it will sometimes produce an irritation of mind; but by a liberal conduct, it may, at length, be totally defaced, or, however, leave no impressions which shall be hurtful to the future concord of Great-Britain and America.

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CONCERNING the introduction *to the Provisional Articles, it is not necessary to make any other observations, than that it consists partly of words of course; that it has a reference to commercial regulations hereafter to be settled; and that, when it was agreed upon to come to terms of pacification with the United States, it was highly proper to do it on a liberal footing. This was the only way to detach them from their intimate connection with France, and to procure that union with them which should be solid, beneficial, and lasting.

* “Whereas reciprocal advantages, and mutual convenience, are found by experience to form the only permanent foundation of peace and friendship between States, it is agreed to form the articles of the proposed Treaty on such principles of liberal equity and reciprocity, as that partial advantages, those seeds of discord, being excluded, such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse between the two countries may be established as to promise and secure to both, perpetual peace and harmony.”

It is remarkable, with regard to the first article, † of the Treaty, which acknowledges the Independence of the Thirteen States, that it hath scarcely excited any degree of complaint, and that the propriety of it hath been very little called in question, either in or out of parliament: and yet this was the point against which all the force of the nation was directed. It was to prevent a catastrophe apprehended to be so fatal, that such enormous expences have been sub-

† ARTICLE I.

“ His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said
 “ United States, viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts
 “ Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
 “ Georgia, to be Free, Sovereign, and Independent States; that he treats with them as such; and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claim to
 “ the government, propriety, and territorial rites of the
 “ same, and every part thereof: and that all disputes
 “ which might arise in future, on the subject of the
 “ boundaries of the said United States, may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared, that the
 “ following are and shall be their boundaries.”

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mitted to, such burthens been endured, and such quantities of human blood been shed. Whatever evils may be supposed to arise from the Independence of America, they are in no degree chargeable on administration. The establishment of it did not depend on any determination which it was in the power of this country to make. Some of the most potent European kingdoms had resolved that the Americans should be free; almost the whole of Europe had ratified their Independence, by the neutral league; they had themselves asserted their claim to an emancipation from the British Government, and had maintained it with success; they were become, in fact, independent; and the resolutions of the House of Commons, in the spring of the last year, had sealed that article for ever. It would have been idle and fruitless in England to contend for the name of Sovereignty, when the thing itself was totally lost.

It

It is impossible to pass over the subject of the Independence of America, without giving way to some reflections on so remarkable an event. The philosophic mind will regard it as a new and illustrious *Æra* in the history of the world; an *Æra*, that hath been surprising in its origin, astonishingly rapid in its completion, and which is big with the most important and interesting consequences. Who could have imagined, when the Colonies, on the fourth of July, 1776, declared themselves to be Independent States, that in less than seven years their claim should be acceded to, and ratified by Britain herself? It is a revolution which it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to parallel in the annals of mankind; and the effects of it will extend to both hemispheres. It will give a different turn to the policy of Europe; and what may be the result of it with respect to the whole of America, is beyond the ability of the most sagacious con-

conjecturer positively to determine. It may, however, be hoped, that the interests of justice, humanity, and liberty, will acquire fresh strength, and be more widely diffused through the globe.

BUT though the enlarged philosopher may find ample reason for consolation, and even for rejoicing, when he reflects upon the Independence of America, the plain English politician may not see cause for viewing the matter in so agreeable a light. The plain English politician will regret that the seeds of divisions were ever sown between Great Britain and the Colonies; and will wish that such a liberal conduct had been adopted, as would have prevented the separation which hath now taken place. If no rash system of taxation had been resolved upon, if commercial regulations had been wisely suited to what the circumstances of things might require, if all proper measures had been taken to preserve and

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to confirm the good-will and affection of the Americans, the two countries might have gone on together in increasing prosperity for fifty, for a hundred years ; perhaps, for a much longer space of time. The season of independence would, indeed, at length arrive ; but it would not have arrived till the situation of the world had rendered it absolutely necessary. It would not have been prematurely forced upon the Colonies ; it might not be the cause of so much desolation and misery ; it might be accomplished with mutual advantage and harmony : or if any calamities should attend it, those calamities would belong to another generation.

BUT since the Independence of America hath been reasonably and unavoidably acknowledged, it is our business to make the best use of an event which can never be recalled. By a wise conduct, it may not prove so unfortunate for this kingdom as might at first view be apprehended ;

ed ; and at any rate, it was better to submit to it than pursue a destructive and hopeless contest. Whilst we are delivered from the vast expence of maintaining and protecting the Colonies, our commercial intercourse with them will still be productive of many advantages. Perhaps, with proper management, the advantages may not be much inferior to what they were in former times ; and possibly, if America, as may rationally be expected, should rapidly increase in populousness and cultivation, the benefits of our trade with her may be greater than ever. There can, at least, be no doubt but that the superiority we possess, in point of capital, of industry, and the suitability of our manufactures to the wants of the United States, will secure to us a large share of their commerce. It will much contribute to so happy an event, for us to treat the Americans in a liberal manner, and to do whatever lies in our power, to promote the return of harmony and affection.

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WITH respect to the second article of
the Treaty, * I shall not embarrass the
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* ARTICLE II.

“ From the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz.
“ that angle which is formed by a line due north from
“ the source of Saint Croix River to the Highlands,
“ along the said islands, which divide those rivers that
“ empty themselves into the River Saint Laurence from
“ those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the north-
“ westernmost head of Connecticut River; thence down
“ along the middle of that river to the forty-fifth degree
“ of north latitude; from thence by a line due west on
“ said latitude, until it strikes the River Iroquois or Ca-
“ taraquy; thence along the middle of said river into
“ Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake, until it
“ strikes the communication by water between that lake
“ and Lake Erie; thence along the middle of said com-
“ munication into Lake Erie; through the middle of said
“ lake until it arrives at the water communication be-
“ tween that lake and Lake Huron; thence along the
“ middle of said water communication into the Lake
“ Huron; thence through the middle of said lake to
“ the water communication between that lake and Lake
“ Superior; thence through Lake Superior, northward
“ of the Isles Royal and Phelipeaux, to the Long Lake;
“ thence through the middle of said Long Lake, and
“ the water communication between it and the Lake of
“ the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods; thence
“ through the said lake to the most north-western point
“ thereof, and from thence on a due west course to the
“ River

reader with geographical discussions, but content myself with some general remarks, which may tend, in a great mea-

“ River Mississippi ; thence by a line to be drawn along
 “ the middle of the said River Mississippi, until it shall
 “ intersect the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree
 “ of north latitude. South, by a line to be drawn due
 “ east from the determination of the line last mentioned,
 “ in the latitude of thirty-one degrees north of the
 “ Equator, to the middle of the River Apalachicola, or
 “ Catahouche ; thence along the middle thereof to its
 “ junction with the Fiant River ; thence strait to the
 “ head of Saint Mary’s River ; and thence down along
 “ the middle of Saint Mary’s River to the Atlantic
 “ Ocean. East, by a line to be drawn along the mid-
 “ dle of the River Saint Croix, from its mouth in the
 “ Bay of Fundy to its source, and from its source direct-
 “ ly north to the aforesaid highlands, which divide the
 “ rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those
 “ which fall into the River Saint Laurence ; compre-
 “ hending all islands within twenty leagues of any part
 “ of the shores of the United States, and lying between
 “ lines to be drawn due east from the points where the
 “ aforesaid boundaries, between Nova Scotia on the one
 “ part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively
 “ touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean ;
 “ excepting such islands as now are, and heretofore have
 “ been, within the limits of the said province of Nova
 “ Scotia.”

sure, to remove the objections that have been made against the boundaries assigned to the dominions of the Thirteen Provinces.

WHAT occurs to me in the first place is, that the limits which are fixed upon are, for the most part, those natural limits which are pointed out by the course of lakes and rivers ; and consequently, they are the only ones that could have been chosen, without giving afterward occasion to much disorder and contention.

IT may farther be observed, that the boundaries allotted to the United States, are the boundaries which were formerly considered as belonging to the country. Indeed, by the Quebec act passed in the year 1774, the limits of Canada were greatly extended. But that was an act which was calculated for tyrannical purposes, and which was particularly hostile to the North Americans ; and, therefore,

fore, it was not to be expected that it should be fixed upon as the basis of the present Treaty.

THAT the Canada fur trade will, in part, be affected, cannot be denied. In consequence of the late troubles in America, the Quebec merchants have for some time possessed the monopoly of that trade; but it was not in the nature of the thing that the monopoly should always be preserved; and it is not an object so great as to merit the continuance of the war. Whenever peace came to be established, the commerce of furs would unavoidably be, in some degree, diverted to a new channel; for nothing can hinder the Indians, when there are rival purchasers, from selling their commodities to the best bidders. However, that the evil will not be so great, or so extensive, as hath by many been supposed, may, perhaps, appear from the following considerations.

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THE country which yields the most valuable furs lies to the northward of the Lakes : for though the beavers are found in all those regions of North-America that are situated between the thirtieth and the sixtieth degrees of latitude, yet their cloathing, which nature has given them to secure them from the cold, is much thicker, and the animals themselves are much more numerous, in the northern than in the southern climes. For this reason it is, that the Indians who inhabit the countries which lie to the south of the lakes, cross over in the summer, and hunt in the northern regions. Thus it appears that the tribes who at present inhabit the dominions of the United States, are obliged to seek their beavers in the country that belongs to Britain ; a circumstance which gives a decided advantage to her merchants : for it must be their own fault if those who hunt in her territory trade with any other persons ; especially as the articles
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for which they exchange their game are those which this kingdom is best able to supply. Such is the advantage which Britain has secured, in her commerce with the numerous Indian tribes who inhabit the southern borders of the Lakes; whilst the trade of the nations to the north must be all her own.

BUT were it admitted, contrary to every apparent fact, that the Americans, by means of the communication which Hudson's River affords, will be able to sell their furs at a lower price at New-York, than that which the British merchant will be obliged to give in Canada, still the manufacturer of England would suffer no inconvenience. To obtain the raw material at the lowest rate is his object; but whether the merchant purchases of the Indian hunter, or of the American trader, is to the manufacturer very immaterial.

FARTHER,

FARTHER, The retention of the forts which lie on the south of the British boundary, and which some think ought to have been retained, would have been inconsistent with every principle of policy and prudence. For if these forts had been reserved as places of strength against the Americans, they would not only have proved inadequate to the object, whilst the expences of the garrisons would have been enormously great, but they would also have excited the same jealousy and dread with regard to *our* designs, which they once did with respect to those of the French, when the Colonies exclaimed that they were hemmed in by a chain of forts. The Treaty of Peace, if such a treaty could have been obtained, would, in that case, have proved not so much a termination of the old, as the beginning of a new war.

IF, on the other hand, the forts had been retained as desirable only on account
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of the protection which they would have afforded to the British traders against the Indian Tribes, the measure would be highly impolitic. It would certainly be more advantageous to erect, on the opposite side of the river, such small places of defence as may be necessary to this purpose, and such other conveniencies as may be requisite for carrying on the fur trade, than to entail upon ourselves an endless contest with America.

It has been asserted, that by not having the possession of Penobscot, the nation is deprived of a territory which might be eminently useful in supplying large masts for the navy. This, however, is by no means the truth of the case ; for the country is already exhausted of the timber which could be serviceable for that purpose. At present, there is not a tree left which is capable of being converted into a mast of any considerable size. If the growing timber of that district should hereafter be able

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to furnish a supply of this kind, such a supply, in a time of peace, will as easily be obtained, in the way of purchase, from an American freeholder, as it would be if the land belonged to our own subjects. But there are other and more effectual resources for providing masts to the British navy.

UPON the whole question concerning the Canada boundaries, it may be observed, that government, in consenting to them, had two views, the one political, the other commercial. In a political light, if we could have gotten back to the state we were in in 1763, it would have been a very desirable circumstance. But since that was become no longer practicable, what was it which sound wisdom prescribed in such a situation? It certainly prescribed that we should lay the foundation of another large and liberal system, the first object of which should be permanent peace. To the attainment of this end, it was necessary
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to prevent every ground of future jealousies and quarrels. If any harsh or galling conditions had been insisted upon, the negotiation would either have entirely broken off, or if the Americans had submitted to them, their prejudices against England would have acquired fresh strength, and occasions have been afforded for those dissensions which might have plunged us again into the horrors of war. It was the part of true policy to pursue the measures that tended to restore a cordial friendship, and which, perhaps, might, at length, be productive of a federal union between the two countries.

IF the matter be considered in a commercial view, it will appear, that it was necessary to proceed upon the establishment of a new principle; a principle which hath already notoriously taken place in the instance of Ireland, and which is avowed by America, not only to England, but to all the powers of

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Europe.

Europe. The system of monopolies and little restrictions in trade, begins to be exploded in the world, and will justly every day grow more and more out of fashion. It is for the real honour and interest of Great-Britain to prosecute an enlarged plan of commerce : and to have contended about a few furs, would have been incompatible with a design of such magnitude and importance.

I HAVE incidentally mentioned the large expences which forts and garrisons, if extended too widely, might occasion. Perhaps, though it may not be thought immediately to concern the vindication of the peace, it will not be disagreeable to the reader to be informed what the province of Canada hath cost the government for six years and four months, ending in October 1782. The sum, exclusively of many and great expences not yet brought to account, amounts to five millions two hundred and ninety-nine

thousand five hundred and nineteen pounds nineteen shillings and sixpence halfpenny *. This sum vastly exceeds all the imports and exports of the trade of that country, though, from peculiar circumstances, these have of late years considerably increased.

GREATLY as the Third Article † of the American Treaty hath by some persons

* See Appendix, No. I.

† ARTICLE III.

“ It is agreed that the people of the United States
 “ shall continue to enjoy, unmolested, the right to take
 “ fish, of every kind, on the Grand Bank, and on all
 “ the other banks of Newfoundland; also in the Gulph
 “ of St. Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea,
 “ where the inhabitants of both countries used at any
 “ time heretofore to fish; and also that the inhabitants
 “ of the United States shall have liberty to take fish, of
 “ every kind, on such parts of the coast of Newfoundland
 “ as British fishermen shall use, (but not to dry or cure
 “ the same on that island); and also on the coasts, bays,
 “ and creeks of all other of his Britannic Majesty’s do-
 “ minions in America; and that the American fisher-
 “ men shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any
 “ of

sons been objected to, it appears to be capable of a very reasonable defence. Indeed, it would have been absolutely impossible, without agreeing to this Article, to have had a peace at all. It was justly and strongly urged by the American Commissioners, that to refuse them the right of fishing, would be to manifest towards them the most hostile intentions, and that it would for ever preclude the hopes of reconciliation. They alledged that the fishery lay in their part of the ocean; that it was their all; that on their side, it was employment, food, export, and the means of paying debts to a barren province; that other states had staples of production, whilst they

“ of the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of Nova-
 “ Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as
 “ the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the
 “ same, or either of them, shall be settled, it shall not
 “ be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at
 “ such settlement, without a previous agreement for
 “ that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or
 “ possessors of the ground.”

had

had none but what they received out of the sea ; that they had enjoyed a freedom of fishery time out of mind ; and that the advantages they obtained from it would be, in part, compensated to Britain, by the resort of their fishermen to our manufactures, and by the supply of fresh provisions to our vessels. But, not to insist upon it, that the claim of the Americans to a share in the fishery could not on any terms have been given up, it may be observed, that, from the conveniency of their situation, it would have been impossible to exclude them from it, by any restrictions whatever. They would have stolen in upon us, in spite of all our endeavours to the contrary, and we should have been involved in endless altercations with them.

THERE are two seasons for the Newfoundland fishery ; the first of which commences in February, and the second in the latter end of May, or the beginning

ning of June. The former, which, however, is far less important than the other, is, from the unavoidable nature of things, absolutely in the power of the Americans. They possess it from the vicinity of their coast; it is a privilege which Providence has put into their hands; and an attempt to deprive them of it, would be as unjust as it would be impracticable. It must ever be almost entirely their own property, because neither our ships, nor those of France, can take their station there so early in the year. With regard to the second and principal fishery, the Americans have not obtained much more by the Treaty than what they heretofore possessed. In fact, they always fished on the Banks, and they frequented the uninhabited harbours on Labrador, for curing their fish. The only additional advantage granted them by the Treaty, is the liberty of fishing on the shores of Newfoundland; and even this they frequently

frequently exercised. In short, to have denied them the privilege of the fishery, would have been to have proclaimed the most determined hostility against them. The only alternative, therefore, was, whether Great-Britain should agree to this privilege, or give up for ever the hope of the benefits to be derived from a friendship with America.

THE Fourth Article * speaks so evidently in its own favour, that it cannot require any discussion. The only observation I shall make upon it is, that the obligation of payment doth not solely extend to the debts contracted before the war, but reaches down to the date of the Treaty. Hence the British creditors have a right to call

* ARTICLE IV.

“ It is agreed, that creditors on either side, shall
 “ meet with no lawful impediment by the recovery of
 “ the full value, in sterling money, of all *bona fide* debts
 “ heretofore contracted.”

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upon

upon the Americans for the payment of debts which they would otherwise have been excused from by the laws of the country then subsisting; for, during the troubles, all transactions with the English were prohibited, and consequently were illegal. A committee of the North-America merchants have expressed their satisfaction with the stipulation of the Fourth Article, and have declared their confidence of having justice done them at the American courts of judicature. The merchants of Glasgow have signified to administration the same sentiments, acknowledging, "that every thing has been procured for them, which could have been expected, when all circumstances are dispassionately considered."

THE fifth article * is that which, of all others,

* ARTICLE V.

"It is agreed, that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective States, to provide

others, is the most attended with embarrassments, and lies the most open to objection.

“ provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties which have been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects, and also of the estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in districts in the possession of his Majesty’s arms, and who have not borne arms against the United States ; and that persons of any other description shall have free liberty to go into any part or parts of any of the Thirteen United States, and therein to remain twelve months unmolested in their endeavours to obtain the restitution of such of their estates, rights, and properties as may have been confiscated ; and that Congress shall also earnestly recommend to the several States a reconsideration and revision of all acts and laws regarding the premises, so as to render the said laws or acts perfectly consistent not only with justice and equity, but with that spirit of conciliation, which on the return of the blessings of peace should universally prevail ; and that Congress shall also earnestly recommend to the several States, that the estates, rights, and properties of such last mentioned persons shall be restored to them ; they refunding to any persons who may be now in possession, the *bona fide* price (where any has been given) which such persons may have paid on purchasing any of the said lands or properties since the confiscation. And it is agreed, that all persons who have any interest in confiscated lands, either by debts, marriage, settlements, or otherwise, shall meet with no lawful impediment in the prosecution of their just rights.”

THE unhappy state of the Loyalists, is undoubtedly an object of great commiseration. There cannot be a single person in this country, who will not, in the hours of reflection, strongly feel for the larger part of them, and who will not acknowledge that every thing ought to be done for them which the nature of the case will admit. Having staked their all in what they apprehended to be the just cause of Britain ; having incurred the resentment of their former brethren ; and having been exposed to the effects of that resentment ; the honour of the nation requires that they should not be forsaken, but that they should be provided for and supported in some mode or other. It ought, however, at the same time, to be remembered, that the particular manner in which protection and compensation are afforded to the Loyalists, must necessarily be determined by the situation of things.

I HAVE good reason to believe that the case of these unfortunate men was taken
up

up by administration with the utmost ardour. The point of a full and complete restitution was urged again and again; the negociation was suspended upon it, and was very near being finally broken off. But it was not in the power of the American Commissioners to proceed farther than they did; neither is it in the power of Congress to do more than *earnestly to recommend* the Loyalists to compassion and favour. Each particular State in America is sovereign and supreme in itself, with regard to legislative and judicial authority; and, therefore, cannot be controuled in the exercise of its jurisdiction over its own subjects. Every man's case must be determined by the laws and judicature of the province to which he belongs; and from the decision that takes place there can be no authoritative appeal. Congress can only interfere by an *earnest recommendation*; and the earnest recommendation of Congress, unless impeded by imprudent conduct on this side the water, cannot fail of producing powerful effects. It would be better to trust, in
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some degree, to the wisdom and liberality of the American States, better to suppose that they may be capable of an enlarged and generous behaviour, than to awaken their prejudices, and excite their anger, by premature suspicions and accusations. Government could not do more for the Loyalists than it has done, unless it had absolutely continued the war on their account. But certainly it would be more eligible to recompence them here to the full amount of their demands, than to ruin the nation, by persisting in that course of hostilities, the fatal consequences of which we had already so deeply experienced.

The American Loyalists come under different descriptions. There can be no doubt but that many of those who, in that country, embraced the royal cause, did it from the purest principles of conscience; and, therefore, every government of America must assuredly pay a just regard to the integrity with which they acted. With respect to those who engaged

gaged in the contest because they had no other means of subsistence, allowance will certainly be made for the peculiarity of their situation ; and it will probably be thought wise and prudent to treat them with indulgence. Policy, as well as humanity, will dictate to the United States, that measures of lenity and reconciliation must be best calculated to heal the wounds, and promote the welfare of their country. Many likewise, of the Loyalists, who fled to England, or took refuge in other parts of Europe, were, I doubt not, timid and peaceable men, who ran away, with horror, from the scenes of civil discord ; who have been silent and afflicted observers of the desolations it has occasioned ; and who may rather be considered as having been neutrals in the war. When such persons shall return to a province which they formerly inhabited, if there be any wisdom in the government of that province, they will be received with cordiality, and treated with kindness.

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The particular situation of the American Commissioners deserves to be considered. Being circumscribed in their powers, which were given under circumstances of distrust and irritation, it might be impossible for them to make all the concessions which would otherwise have been desirable. Like lawyers, they might be obliged to adhere rigidly to their instructions; and to have protracted the treaty till fresh instructions could be obtained, might have been attended with the most fatal consequences. It is, however, to be hoped, that their principals, when they find that every ground of suspicion concerning the hostile disposition of this country is removed, will abolish all distinctions, and proceed upon a nobler policy, that of forgiving and forgetting every cause of civil discord. An illustrious example of it has been set by Great Britain; and those who know most of the treaty have affirmed, that if we had not preferred returning affection with America to any interests with France and Spain, we might, upon a narrow line of conduct,

have

have made our negotiation with these two powers the first object of attention. But a preference was justly given to the recovery of American confidence and affection. The provisional articles were signed independently of either France or Spain. The Americans are in no respect obliged to France, and much less to Spain, for the advantages they have obtained. They owe no thanks to France, even for the boundaries which are conceded them in the back settlements; and much less are they beholden to that nation for the liberal share that hath been granted them in the fishery; which, on the part of Great Britain, indicates all the warmth of confiding friendship, rather than of a jealous alliance. These are considerations which, when duly reflected upon, cannot but have their effect in engaging the Americans to make suitable returns, by removing the causes of distrust and complaint. When time hath a little softened the prejudices and dislikes so natural, in certain circum-

stances, to the human mind, wisdom and good sense will prescribe to them, that nothing can be more for their interest, than, by an enlarged and manly conduct, to destroy the seeds of future animosities and contentions. The opinion which I have of the rectitude of their political understandings, inspires me with the hope that such a conduct will speedily be pursued. For let us attend to what would be the result of a contrary course of behaviour. The American Loyalists and Refugees are a considerable body of men: they are active by nature, as well as by habit. If they should be generally proscribed, and banished from their native countries, they will form, wherever they settle, a kind of sect, which it were to be wished did not exist upon the face of the earth. Upon whatever spot they fix, they will erect an Anti-American standard. They will become eternal enemies to their former brethren. If they retreat to England, will it be of advantage to America; will it serve the general cause of commerce

and of freedom, to have the tongues and the pens of any set of persons employed in decrying the justice and humanity of a new country? If they settle in Nova Scotia, in Canada, or in the West India islands, will they promote that amicable intercourse which every upright man would wish to see universally prevalent, and which the principle of the Provisional Treaty gives the surest proofs of its design to inculcate? It cannot be right to permit old ferments to remain, and to be productive of perpetuated rancour and resentment. Disappointment has no other source of gratification than the indulgence of such unhappy passions, but success is above it. New states, if wisely conducted, and if they pay a just regard to the benefit either of present or of future times, will act upon liberal maxims. These principles are so congenial with the tenets of freemen, and so natural to every generous mind in the hour of success, that there is the utmost reason to expect that the Fifth Article of the Treaty will be so much re-

garded as a point of honour and policy with those who are to ratify and to execute it, as to make the vindication of it absolutely safe in their hands. But if, unhappily, and contrary to every reasonable expectation, the new country should fail in the exercise of that reconciliatory spirit which honour and policy, and, I may add, religion, demand; the old country, in whose cause the Loyalists have fought, and in whose resources they have trusted, will be bound to make that just reparation for their losses, and to procure that alleviation of their sufferings, which their particular cases may require.

THE sixth article † being equally rational and humane, requires no vindication. Whatever part any men may have taken

† ARTICLE VI.

“ That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor
 “ any prosecutions commenced against any person or
 “ persons, for, or by reason of, the part which he or they
 “ may have taken in the present war; and that no per-
 “ son shall, on that account, suffer any future loss or
 “ damage,

taken in America, however hostile they may have been against the United States, they are liable to no farther confiscations or prosecutions, and their persons, if they be prisoners, are to be set at liberty. All this cannot but tend to quiet many an uneasy mind, and to promote a spirit of reconciliation.

As little can be objected to the seventh article. * Peace being restored, I hope, that,

“ damage, either in his person, liberty, or property ;
 “ and that those who may be in confinement on such
 “ charges, at the time of the Ratification of the Treaty
 “ in America, shall be immediately set at liberty, and
 “ the prosecutions so commenced shall be discontinued.”

* ARTICLE VII.

“ There shall be a firm and perpetual peace, between
 “ his Britannic Majesty and the said United States, and
 “ between the subjects of the one, and the citizens of
 “ the other ; wherefore all hostilities both by sea and
 “ land shall then immediately cease : all prisoners on
 “ both sides shall be set at liberty ; and his Britannic
 “ Majesty shall, with all convenient speed, and without
 “ causing

that, according to the language of the Treaty, it will be firm and perpetual ; to which end nothing can so effectually concur as a liberal and manly conduct in both countries. With regard to the evacuations required by the article, they must follow of course, from the recognition of the Independence of America. The situation of many who have quitted Charlestown, and who must quit New-York and other places, is undoubtedly to be lamented ; but it is one of those evils which cannot be avoided.

“ causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes, or other property of the American inhabitants,
 “ withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets, from
 “ the United States, and from every port, place, and
 “ harbour, within the same ; leaving in all fortifications the American artillery that may be therein :
 “ and shall also order, and cause all archives, records, deeds, and papers belonging to any of the said States,
 “ or their citizens, which in the course of the war may
 “ have fallen into the hands of his officers, to be forthwith restored and delivered to the proper states and
 “ persons to whom they belong.”

THE eighth article * is an article of some advantage at present, and from which very considerable benefit may be expected to arise hereafter. As the countries on the banks of the Mississippi, and in the interior parts of America, shall become more and more cultivated, there will be a greater opening for commerce, in its various branches. By the rising population of the western world, the trade in the Mississippi may prove, in time, to be a much larger object than is now likely to be conceived. In order to ensure the benefits resulting from the eighth article, it will be the interest both of Britain and the United States, to provide, by express stipulations with the Court of Spain, that the entrance of the Mississippi shall not be obstructed ; and I

* ARTICLE VIII.

“ The navigation of the Mississippi, from its source to
 “ the Ocean, shall for ever remain free and open to the
 “ subjects of Great Britain, and the citizens of the
 “ United States.”

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am well grounded in asserting, that a matter of such consequence will meet with all the attention it deserves. If, likewise, in any future time, the Floridas or New Orleans shall come into the possession either of the English or the Americans, provision is already made for the free navigation of the Mississippi, without the necessity of having recourse to a fresh negotiation for that purpose.

ON the ninth and last article * of the Provisional Treaty there is nothing to be said. As the war had already been suspended, it was not probable that, on either side, any captures should be made; but if such cases should happen, it was requisite that there should be a previous agreement for mutual restitution.

* ARTICLE IX.

“ In case it should so happen that any place or territory belonging to Great Britain or to the United States, should be conquered by the arms of either, from the other, before the arrival of these Articles in America, it is agreed, that the same shall be restored without difficulty, and without requiring any compensation.”

UPON

UPON the whole, it appears that no very decisive or important objection can be urged against the Provisional Treaty with America. Those who had so long reprobated the war with the Colonies, as impolitic, ruinous, and even unjust, ought to be the last to complain of the return of peace. However hostile they may be to the persons of some great men, consistency of character and conduct would require that they should approve of measures which they themselves would have adopted, had they continued in power. As to those who were the most sanguine for American subjugation, and the most active in attempting it, it behoves them to remember, that, if any unpleasant conditions have been submitted to, their bad counsels and wretched management have imposed that necessity upon the nation. It would, therefore, be decent in them, from a conscious sense of shame and reproach, to seal their lips in eternal silence.

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BUT not to dwell on considerations of this kind ; what did sound policy dictate with regard to the method of treating with America ? It certainly dictated that we should not have a view to flight and temporary, but to real and permanent advantages. It dictated, that we should guard against awakening their jealousies and resentments, and that, by reasonable and even generous concessions, we should lay a foundation for that sincere friendship and lasting connection, which shall be displayed in a grand commercial intercourse, and a mutual participation of prosperity for ages yet to come. The observation hath been made before ; but the importance of it is such, that it deserves to be again recommended to the attention of the reader.

I COME now to the consideration of the Preliminary Articles of the Treaties to be concluded with France and Spain. And here I must again desire the reader to reflect
upon

upon the situation to which we were reduced. When that situation is attended to, when we recollect the losses and expences we had sustained, the many possessions we had been deprived of, and the difficulty and danger of carrying on the contest against one of the most formidable confederacies which history exhibits, I am satisfied that the terms of the pacification will appear, to a candid and dispassionate mind, to be as favourable as could be expected and obtained.

THE first preliminary article* of the Treaty with France, being an article of course,

* ARTICLE I.

“ As soon as the preliminaries shall be signed and
 “ ratified, sincere friendship shall be re-established between
 “ his Britannic Majesty, and his most Christian Majesty,
 “ their kingdoms, states, and subjects, by sea and
 “ by land, in all parts of the world : orders shall be sent
 “ to the armies and squadrons, as well as to the subjects
 “ of the two powers, to stop all hostilities, and to live
 “ in the most perfect union, forgetting what is past, of

course, and expressed in the customary propriety of language, admits of no discussion. To part of the five next articles †, which relate to the fishery, objections

“ which their Sovereigns give them the order and example. And, for the execution of this article, sea passes shall be given on each side for the ships which shall be dispatched to carry the news of it to the possessions of the said powers.”

† ARTICLE II.

“ His Majesty the King of Great Britain shall preserve in full right the island of Newfoundland, and the adjacent islands, in the same manner as the whole was ceded to him by the thirteenth article of the Treaty of Utrecht, save the exceptions which shall be stipulated by the fifth article of the present Treaty.”

ARTICLE III.

“ His most christian Majesty, in order to prevent quarrels which have hitherto arisen between the two nations of England and France, renounces the right of fishing, which belongs to him by virtue of the said article of the Treaty of Utrecht, from Cape Bonavista to Cape St. John, situated on the eastern coast of Newfoundland, in about fifty degrees of north latitude; whereby the French fishery shall commence at the said Cape St. John, shall go round by the north, and going
“ down

tions have been made ; but not, I apprehend, with much strength of reason. The stipulation of the third article, by which the French King renounces the right of fishing from Cape Bonavista to Cape St. John, and obtains an extension of that privilege on the western side of the island of Newfoundland, is so far from being injurious, that it is highly advantageous to this country. By this stipulation, an

“ down the western coast of the island of Newfoundland,
“ shall have for boundary, the place called Cape Raye,
“ situated in forty-seven degrees fifty minutes latitude.”

ARTICLE IV.

“ The French fishermen shall enjoy the fishery assigned them by the foregoing article, as they have a right to enjoy by virtue of the Treaty of Utrecht.”

ARTICLE V.

“ His Britannic Majesty shall cede in full right to his most Christian Majesty the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon.”

ARTICLE VI.

“ With regard to the right of fishing in the Gulph of St. Laurence, the French shall continue to enjoy it conformably to the fifth article of the Treaty of Paris.”

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end is put to the rivalry and disputes which before existed between the two nations relative to the matter in question. By the removal of the French to the western side of the island, the eastern and south-eastern coast is left to the uninterrupted possession of the English. It is on this coast that the fish are the largest and most plentiful, and that the cure of them is infinitely easier than in the Streights of Belleisle, where the fogs are abundantly more prevalent. According to the testimony of every officer who has served at Newfoundland, and particularly of those who surveyed it under Captain Cook ; and according to the testimony, likewise, of the towns engaged in the trade, one league of coast between Cape Bonavista and Cape John is worth ten on the western side. This matter is put out of all doubt by the numerous establishments between these two Capes, and by there being none whatever on the western coast, excepting one, which was calculated

lated with a view to the whale fishery, and may be continued with much greater advantage on the coast of Labrador. Indeed, it does not appear that the western coast has at any time been frequented by our people for the sake of the cod fishery. By the Treaty of Utrecht, which was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris, the vessels of France were allowed to carry on the fishery to the eastward of Newfoundland, as far as to Cape Bonavista. They hence found means, by their vicinity to the Banks, where the prime cod are caught, to encroach, under various pretences, upon the privileges of the British seamen; and, in the quarrels that arose, the English were generally the sufferers, in consequence of the French having a larger number of men, both in their boats and their ships, than is our practice. But they are now confined to two points, Cape St. John on the north end, and Cape Raye on the south-west end of the coast, with liberty, in conformity

mity to the Treaty of Paris, of drying their fish on the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon.

As to the cession, by the fifth article, of these two islands, in full right to his most Christian Majesty, it is a matter of little consequence. The harbour of St. Pierre is very small, and not capable of receiving men of war, having a bar across the entrance, on which there is no more than twelve or fourteen feet water, at high water. The road will admit of ships of force, but the bottom is very rocky, and only safe in the summer season. Miquelon has a road at the north end of the island, where ships may anchor in six or seven fathom water. It is a station of no advantage: for the vessels lie quite open to the easterly winds, and will always be exposed to the attacks of an enemy. For these reasons, and on account of the small distance of St. Pierre and Miquelon from the coast of Newfoundland-

foundland, on which are harbours where men of war may ride in safety, it can be of little service to fortify the two islands. A proof of this is, that the French never attempted to erect any fortifications on them during the war, but, on its breaking out, immediately abandoned them. Should they, in fact, construct any forts there, of what avail could they be against the superiority of the British possessions and power in that part of the world?

It hath been said, that these islands, when fortified, will command the entrance into the Gulph of St. Laurence, which is at least forty leagues distant. It might with more propriety be asserted, that Brest commands the entrance into Plymouth, or that the isles of Scilly command the entrance into St. George's Channel.

WITH regard to the seventh and the eighth preliminary articles, * which relate to the West India islands, it is impossible not to acknowledge, that the terms we have obtained are fully equal to what we could have had reason to expect.

* ARTICLE VII.

“ The King of Great Britain shall restore to France
“ the island of St. Lucia, and shall cede and guarantee
“ to her that of Tobago.”

ARTICLE VIII.

“ The most Christian King shall restore to Great Britain the islands of Grenada, and the Grenadines, St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Christopher’s, Nevis, and Montserrat: and the fortresses of those islands conquered by the arms of Great Britain, and by those of France, shall be restored in the same condition in which they were when the conquest of them was made; provided that the terms of eighteen months, to be computed from the time of the ratification of the Definitive Treaty, shall be granted to the respective subjects of the Crowns of Great Britain and France, who may have settled in the said islands, and in other places which shall be restored by the Definitive Treaty, to sell their estates, recover their debts, and to transport their effects, and retire without being restrained, on account of their religion, or any other cause whatever, except in cases of debt, or of criminal prosecution.”

No one can deny that the restorations stipulated by the eighth article are of great importance. In exchange for St. Lucia, which we had captured from the French, they have given back six out of the seven islands they had taken from us, and have only retained that of Tobago. When a possession is lost, it is natural to exaggerate the advantages of it, and this hath been done with respect to the last mentioned island. Its cotton is good, but the production of that commodity is not confined to Tobago. Cotton is procured from the rest of the islands, and from other parts of the world. The Manchester manufactory flourished both before we were possessed of Tobago, and since it hath been captured by the French: nor is there any reason to suppose that the trade of that town is likely to decline. Tobago is not esteemed very healthful, nor is its situation such as to render it capable of being easily defended. It hath scarcely any conveniencies as a

station, which are not furnished by Grenada and Barbadoes; and neither its exports nor imports are so great as to make it of extraordinary value in a commercial view. ‡ The possession of Tobago is, it is true, a benefit to France, and some loss to England; but, all things considered, we ought to be thankful that the Treaty hath been so favourable to us with regard to the West India islands. It is of infinitely greater consequence to the inhabitants of these islands, to have them peaceably restored, than if (which, however, there was no ground to hope for) they could have been recovered by conquest.

THE importance of St. Lucia hath been magnified in the highest degree, with the particular purpose of derogating from the preliminary articles. I have no intention to depreciate its value. The excellence of its harbour and the advantage

‡ Appendix, No. 2.

of its situation, undoubtedly make it a possession of real consequence. But, not to mention that it never was of any great consideration in a commercial view, it should be remembered that its principal importance does not consist so much in its being a safe-guard to any of our islands, as in its being a check upon Martinico. Dominica, on the other hand, which is a fact not generally known, stands much in the same relation to Guadaloupe. It is, likewise, a station, from which, in time of war, all communication may be intercepted between the two great French islands. Besides this, it is a natural cover to all our old islands, which will always be protected by it, if it be made, what it ought to be, our chief object of attention, and accordingly, be secured and fortified in a proper manner. An undeniable proof of the estimation in which it was held by the French is, that when they destroyed the fortifications of the other islands, they continued to spend
 very

very large sums in adding to the works upon Dominica. This is a circumstance, which, whilst it shews the value of the island, affords no slight evidence of the resolution and firmness wherewith the restorations of the eighth article of the Preliminary Treaty were insisted upon, in the course of the negotiation. With regard to the West Indies, one would think it impossible that any man, excepting a planter on the ceded island, should dare to complain. The Treaty, in respect to that quarter, is vastly more honourable than the Peace of Paris was at the close of the last war, though that was a war of conquest.

THE four next articles, * which are relative to Africa, will not be found
liable

* ARTICLE IX.

“ The King of Great Britain shall cede and guarantee, in full right, to his most Christian Majesty, the
“ river

liable to any material objections. As the French had taken Senegal, which origi-

“ river of Senegal and its dependencies, with the forts
“ of St. Louis, Pqdor, Gelam, Arguin, and Portendie.
“ His Britannic Majesty shall restore, likewise, the island
“ of Goree, which shall be given up in the condition in
“ which it was when the British arms took possession of
“ it.”

ARTICLE X.

“ The most Christian King shall, on his side, gua-
“ rantee to his Majesty the King of Great Britain the
“ possession of Fort James, and of the river Gambia.”

ARTICLE XI.

“ In order to prevent all discussion in that part of
“ the world, the two Courts shall agree, either by
“ the Definitive Treaty, or by a separate act, upon the
“ boundaries to be fixed to their respective possessions.
“ The gum trade shall be carried on in future as the
“ English and French nations carried it on, before the
“ year 1755.”

ARTICLE XII.

“ In regard to the rest of the coasts of Africa, the
“ subjects of both powers shall continue to frequent
“ them, according to the custom which has prevailed
“ hitherto.”

nally

nally belonged to them, it was natural that they should insist upon retaining it; and a point of national honour might induce them to wish for the cession of Goree, as that island had, likewise, been formerly their own property. Neither Senegal nor Goree are objects of any distinguished importance. The chief value of Senegal is undoubtedly the advantage it possesses with regard to the gum trade. The whole commerce, however, of that settlement never amounted to more than what is carried on by many a single house in England. Lord Chatham thought the matter of so little consequence, that, if I mistake not, after Senegal was taken in the war of 1755, he granted the monopoly of its trade to Mr. Cumming, a quaker, who had planned the expedition. As to Goree, it is, in every view, of very little worth. Its commerce is too inconsiderable to deserve being mentioned, and its unhealthfulness renders it the grave of our countrymen. The Treaty,
there-

therefore, may be considered as having transplanted to France the benefits of a single mercantile house, with some trifle, also, of public revenue. But though a permanent peace required that these cessions should be made to the French, what we have yielded is more in sound than in value. Gambia is a finer river than that of Senegal, has no bar, hath a rich country on both sides, is navigable upwards of several hundred miles, and is near to the gold coast. The possession of the navigation of this river opens great prospects, and if the object be attended to and improved, it may hereafter become the source of benefits, of which at present we have scarcely any conception. But independently of this consideration, the English still possess the power of carrying on the African trade with advantage; and the boundaries designed to be settled by the Definitive Treaty will tend to remove the causes of future dissention.

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INSTEAD of entering into a minute examination of every particular circumstance that is mentioned in the four preliminary articles * that relate to the East Indies,

ARTICLE XIII.

“ The King of Great Britain shall restore to his most Christian Majesty all the establishments which belonged to him at the commencement of the present war on the coast of Orixá, and in Bengal, with liberty to surround Chandernagor with a ditch for draining the waters ; and his Britannic Majesty engages to take such measures as may be in his power, for securing to the subjects of France, in that part of India, as also on the coast of Orixá, Coromandel, and Malabar, a safe, free, and independent trade, such as was carried on by the late French East India Company, whether it be carried on by them as individuals, or as a Company.”

ARTICLE XIV.

“ Pondicherry, as well as Karical, shall likewise be restored, and guaranteed to France ; and his Britannic Majesty shall procure, to serve as a dependency round Pondicherry, the two districts of Valanour and Bahour ; and as a dependency round Karical, the four contiguous Magans.”

ARTICLE

Indies, I shall make some general observations upon the subject, which will fully justify the conduct of Government in acceding to these articles. Indeed, no event that could have been expected to arise in India, either by land or sea, from the continuance of the war, was likely to have proved so fortunate for the East In-

ARTICLE XV.

“ France shall again enter into the possession of
 “ Mahé, and of the Comptoir at Surat ; and the French
 “ shall carry on commerce in this part of India con-
 “ formably to the principles laid down in the thirteenth
 “ article of this Treaty.”

ARTICLE XVI.

“ In case France has allies in India, they shall be
 “ invited, as well as those of Great Britain, to accede to
 “ the present pacification ; and for that purpose a term
 “ of four months, to be computed from the day on which
 “ the proposal shall be made to them, shall be allowed
 “ them to make their decision ; and in case of refusal on
 “ their part, their Britannic and most Christian Maje-
 “ sties agree not to give them any assistance, directly or
 “ indirectly, against the British or French possessions,
 “ or against the ancient possessions of their respective
 “ allies ; and their said Majesties shall offer them their
 “ good offices towards a mutual accommodation.”

dia Company, or could have had so effectual a tendency to the preservation and security of the possessions of Great Britain, and those of her allies in that country, as the present peace. The terms of it are almost as beneficial to the Company as those which were dictated to France in the year 1763; and they are far beyond what the alarming situation of the Company's affairs in India could have given us any reason to hope. As to the concessions, they are not worth mentioning; for the expence of carrying on the war in India had become so enormous, and the resources there are so much exhausted, that if the war were to be prolonged, even victory itself could not have preserved the Company from destruction.

THE native troops, it is true, are sure to be defeated, whenever they attempt to stand against the regular forces of Great Britain; but that might not have been the case, when France came to bring in four
or

or five thousand disciplined troops to fight by their side; and which may, perhaps, be the situation of things at this instant.

THE French fleet in India, which is known to be a powerful one, joined to the Dutch squadron, might, at least, have kept the Company at bay, and frustrated every endeavour to throw supplies into the Carnatic. These supplies have already been intercepted to a considerable amount; and unless those large and necessary aids arrive safe, the army can have no chance of recovering the parts of the Carnatic which Hyder has over-run, and still possesses; our troops, from the want of provisions, having been repeatedly obliged to abandon their victory, and retreat from the field they had won. From these circumstances Hyder has been enabled, with his numerous horse, of which we have scarcely any, to range the Carnatic for two years and a half; driving off the cattle, and

and even the inhabitants in some places ; and burning, or otherwise laying waste, where he could not carry off the produce, or protect the country. These are no exaggerated facts.

WHENEVER the Company shall be relieved from all opposition from France, and Hyder be retired from the Carnatic, it will require some years of rest and security to recover that country from the devastations occasioned by his inroads.

BENGAL too, from the drains of men and treasure that rich province has experienced, will, with all its natural resources, stand in need of a long time to be recovered from its present exhausted state.

THE Supreme Council seem to have been truly sensible of their alarming situation, and of their approaching dangers

gers from surrounding enemies, aided by European powers. For after Hyder's irruption, and previously to our declaration against Holland, the Governor-General and Council had proposed to give up the Tinivelli country to the Dutch, to obtain their assistance against Hyder. Nay, in 1781, the Governor-General and Council had it in contemplation to surrender up the Circars to the Nizam, to draw him off from the league formed with Hyder and the Morattas. These two striking instances of their sense of the dangers which threatened the safety of our possessions, are to be found upon the records of the Company; whilst private intelligence makes mention of a third, wherein an offer had been made to Hyder of the Madura country, with the strong fort of Trichinapoli, to induce him to retire out of the Carnatic.

SUCH are the incontestable proofs that the Company's large possessions in India
have

have been exposed to very great risques ; and they are proofs that must carry conviction even to minds that are uninformed in Asiatic affairs. For concessions of this nature have seldom been proposed by any state, unless the alarms and apprehensions for domestic safety have stared them full in the face, and told them that ruin was speedily approaching.

BESIDES these particular circumstances, the condition of the Company's finances, both at home and abroad, was sufficient to instruct this country, that the certain dangers to which the national interests in India were exposed, rendered an immediate peace absolutely necessary, even if it had been procured on terms less favourable than those which have been actually obtained. There was no other method of recovering our ascendancy in that part of the world.

THE forces at this time in India, in the pay of the Company, exclusively of the King's troops serving there, are not less than a hundred thousand men. The expence of maintaining so large an army in the field, is much beyond what Bengal alone can support; whilst the Nabob of Arcot can furnish little or no assistance from his revenues in the present situation of the Carnatic. Yet these hundred thousand men are scarcely sufficient to act against our numerous enemies in that country.

THE state of the Company's treasury at home is such, as renders it impossible to afford any assistance to India, or even to go on without immediate aid, either of money or credit, from parliament. The case is, that the Company is shut out from sufficient returns by the failure of resources in India, and by the delays to which the ships are subjected; and, at the same time, the drafts on

N England,









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England, and the expences for the troops, stores, and freights, have been increasing ever since the commencement of the war. The freights, from the high price of insurance, have swelled to an amount which no trade, however lucrative, could long support. The investments, in the present situation of affairs, can have no assistance from the revenues, as these revenues have latterly been very insufficient to answer the different demands of government. The investments sent home in the last two years have been chiefly procured with money, raised by bills of exchange drawn in England, or borrowed in the several settlements on bond, under the Company's seal, at an interest of eight per cent. The bills of exchange drawn on the Company, in the seasons of 1780 and 1781, amount to one million six hundred thousand pounds; and the farther sum of two hundred and seventy thousand pounds is expected to have been drawn to complete the season of 1781.

THE bonded debts, in the three settlements, of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, amount to four millions, paying an interest of three hundred thousand pounds a year. And to so low an ebb is our credit in India reduced, that the Governor-General and Council, in their letter of the eighth of April last, inform the Company, that they have adopted a new mode of keeping up the investment, by private subscribers, which will provide cargoes to the amount of eighty lacks, on the usual terms of privilege, at the risque of individuals; and which is to be repaid to them according to the produce of the sales in England. This evidently goes to confirm, that the Supreme Council had neither money to spare, nor credit to raise any, for the purchase of goods, but by assigning the produce of the goods, as security for the money advanced; in the room of trusting to the general credit of the Company, for the discharge of

the bills that would otherwise have been drawn.

AFTER these loans are discharged, the remainder goes to the Company ; all incidental expences, however, being first paid to the lenders ; the amount of which may be guessed, by the allowance of twenty thousand pounds a year being given, by these creditors, to the person appointed by them to be at the head of the inspection of the investment on their part.

THESE are striking proofs of the exhausted state of the Company's credit in India, for the exigencies of commerce.

THE following statement of the revenues and disbursements there, will equally shew how inadequate the resources are to answer the expences of government. The net annual revenues,
cleared

cleared of the charges of collections, dur-
bar stipends, and allowances, taking in
the profits from salt and opium, produc-
ed, by the last accounts, £. 2,600,000

Cheynt Sing's tribute	—	300,000
Oude subsidy about	—	450,000
		<hr/>
		3,350,000

Net amount of Bombay re-
venues — — 250,000

Net produce from Madras
and the Circars, by ac-
count ending in April
1781 — — 400,000

	<hr/>
	4,000,000

Tanjore subsidy *	—	160,000
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Nabob's subsidy and jag-
heer, was in arrears to a
considerable amount.

* Owing by the Nabob, July 1781, for his arrears,
exclusively of jagheer rent — £. 400,000
The jagheer in arrears a year and a half, or 200,000

This

This sum of four million and one hundred and sixty thousand pounds was all which the Company had any chance of receiving, within the year, whilst the war remained, and Hyder continued to ravage the Carnatic, and to prevent the Nabob from drawing any considerable supplies from the revenues of his country.

SUCH is the state of our resources in India. On the other hand, the expence for the Bengal establishment, exclusively of any aids to other settlements, amounted, for the years 1780 and 1781, to — — — * £. 3,400,000

The Bombay establishment, reckoning in seven lacks for the additional levies, for the years 1780 and 1781, is estimated at — 700,000

* The estimate sent home for 1781 and 1782, is to the same amount.

The

The peace establishment at	
Fort St. George, civil	£.
and military*, is set at -	720,000
Additional expences, which	
appear to have been in-	
curred in the first year	
of Hyder's irruption —	300,000
	<hr/>
	1,020,000

Add to this the expence to	
be paid for ten regiments,	
and victualling eighteen	
or twenty fail of the line,	
which cannot be estimat-	
ed at less than 4 or	
500,000/. more —	450,000
Present annual expences -	5,570,000
Deduct annual resources ari-	
sing in India — —	4,160,000

* Supplies from Bengal, between July 1780	£.
and 1781, in money and provisions —	360,000
Borrowed on bond — — —	180,000
Bills of exchange — — —	250,000
	<hr/>
	790,000
Arrears of civil and military and other	
accounts — — — —	260,000
	Hence

Hence an annual deficiency of one million four hundred and ten thousand pounds, was sure to be found at the end of every year, whilst Hyder remained in the Carnatic, and war had continued with France ; for, in that case, the revenues and subsidies would be more likely to decline, than to recover.

As a farther testimony of the distressed situation of the Carnatic, it appears, by the last advices from Fort St. George, dated March the 22d, 1782, that the Madras army, exclusively of the Bengal detachment, were five months in arrears ; which, with the arrears of the civil establishment, amount to no less than forty lacks of rupees, or nearly 500,000*l*.

FROM all these circumstances it is evident, that the credit of the Company abroad is prodigiously weakened ; and as they have no resources at home for
the

the assistance of the settlements in India, the nation would have had, at least, a million and a half a-year to furnish for the support of the military operations in the East-Indies, so long as the war had continued with France. Now would not this have been a heavy burthen on England, independently of the aid which the trade of the Company might also require ? Would it not have been a burthen which a minister could not answer to God or his country, for laying upon the nation, if it could have been avoided even by far greater concessions ? Are we to go on eternally in wild and dangerous expeditions, till our wealth and strength are totally exhausted ? The example of the Athenians, in their enterprize against the Syracusans, so finely described by Thucydides, may instruct us in the folly and ruin of engaging in distant wars, the expences and hazards of which could not be for ever supported, if we were the most powerful people that have at any time existed on the face of the earth.

THE assistance to the East Indies above mentioned, if the war had continued, must have been given, or the country abandoned; for otherwise the numerous forces at present on foot in India would have been in danger of revolting. Government likewise, by a failure of the trade, would have suffered a very considerable reduction in the customs.

IN short, the expences would have accumulated if the war had continued; and perhaps would have ended in the ruin of the Company, and the dismemberment of our valuable possessions in India; for an army of such magnitude, if ill paid, might have assisted in wresting them from us.

BUT when our possessions are undisturbed, and the Carnatic is restored to the Nabob of Arcot, if a reduction of the forces shall take place, and a free circulation be allowed to commerce in India;

dia; and if, above all, a rigid œconomy and manly government be established, such as is referred to in the King's speech; the Company, aided by parliament, may be enabled again to flourish, and in time to discharge their debts.

THIS, however, must depend on peace and security, and on the encouragement that shall be given to the cultivation and improvement of Bengal and the Circars.

AFTER so ample and authentic an account of the state of our affairs in the East Indies, and of the necessity of peace in that country, I should think myself very ill employed, were I to descend to a particular consideration of the objections, which, from the want of a comprehensive view of things, or from other motives, have been made to the permission to surround Chandernagor with a ditch, and to the grant of a small territory round Pondicherry and Karical. I may safely

appeal to the good sense of my readers to determine, whether what has been advanced does not fully shew the wisdom of Government with respect to this part of the Preliminary Articles with the Court of France. To suppose, or to assert, that better terms could have been obtained, can only result from ignorance or wilful misrepresentation; and, therefore, the Ministry are entitled to the highest credit and applause, for the attention and success with which they have conducted the negotiations of peace with regard to the East Indies.

THE only remaining article that requires to be distinctly considered, is that concerning Dunkirk; * and which car-

* ARTICLE XVII.

“ The King of Great Britain, desirous of giving his
 “ most Christian Majesty a sincere proof of reconcilia-
 “ tion and friendship, and of contributing to the soli-
 “ dity of the peace on the point of being re-establish-
 “ ed, will consent to the abrogation and suppression of
 “ all the articles relative to Dunkirk, from the Treaty
 “ of Peace concluded at Utrecht in 1713, inclusively to
 “ this time.”

ries

ries upon the face of it one proper reason for the stipulation there made. It has been acceded to, in order to give the French King a sincere proof of reconciliation and friendship, and to contribute to the solidity of the Peace which is ready to be re-established. To insist upon a matter which is disgraceful to a great nation, when the object is of no real advantage to ourselves, can never be the dictate of sound policy. Concessions, from which no evil consequences can arise, and the tendency of which is to remove the causes of jealousy and hatred that have long subsisted between powerful kingdoms, may be productive of very happy effects, and, to say the least of them, cannot justly be liable to censure. This is precisely the case with respect to the point given up, in the article concerning Dunkirk. In consenting to take away the ignominy which was imposed by former Treaties upon France, we deprive them of a strong incentive to perpetual
resent-

resentment and hostility ; and so little hath hitherto been gotten by war, that it is high time to establish permanent peace upon a manly foundation. Besides, Dunkirk was at no period of the importance which was assigned to it by the enthusiasm of Englishmen. However, as a general sense prevailed of the injury it was capable of doing to this country, and as we stood in a condition which enabled us to demand the demolition of its fortifications, it was wise to make the demand. But the circumstances of things are now changed, not only with regard to our own situation, but with regard to the state of the Harbour of Dunkirk. That harbour, if it was once formidable to England, can be formidable no longer. Lying, as it does, near a shoaly and rocky part of the Channel, it is not fit for receiving or sending out ships of war of that large draught and burthen which are now constructed. No art or expence can enable it to contain a fleet of the
line ;

line; and so sensible are the French of this fact, that, during the two last wars, they have never thought of making the harbour of Dunkirk the rendezvous of any of their squadrons. Indeed, if it were in a far better condition, it would separate their navy too much to be of any real service. Their ships, whether single or united, would, when they attempted to go to the harbour of Brest, or elsewhere, to join the rest of their navy, always be exposed to the hazard of being captured or beaten by the English fleet. But Dunkirk is now only fit to be rendered, in a time of war, what no treaty can prevent, a nest of privateers; and these can come out from other ports, equally near to the British coast. On this account, it is highly probable that France will not think it necessary to be at the immense charge of restoring its fortifications. It is the opinion of several gentlemen who have been the most ardent opposers of the late Treaties, that Dunkirk is by no means of the impor-

tance which has formerly been supposed; and consequently, there is the less occasion for my insisting longer upon the subject.

It may not, however, be amiss to observe, that this port, though it cannot be of material injury to us in a time of war, may be of great advantage in a time of peace. It is entitled to peculiar privileges, and is admirably fitted for carrying on the English and Irish trade to the low countries, which is a very important and valuable branch of commerce. It will be far wiser, therefore, to convert Dunkirk in this view to our benefit, than to have permitted it to remain as an object of jealousy and contention. Perhaps the prejudice against it may in part have been fomented by the Dutch, who did not like the rivalry that might arise from it in point of trade.

I HAVE nothing to say concerning the rest of the Preliminary Articles with
France,

France, excepting to declare my hope,
that the agreement, in the eighteenth
article, * for naming Commissioners to
enquire

* ARTICLE XVIII.

“ By the Definitive Treaty, all those which have
“ existed till now between the two High Contracting
“ Parties, and which shall not have been derogated
“ from, either by the said Treaty, or by the present
“ Preliminary Treaty, shall be renewed and confirmed;
“ and the two Courts shall name Commissioners to in-
“ quire into the state of commerce between the two na-
“ tions, in order to agree upon new arrangements of
“ trade, on the footing of reciprocity and mutual con-
“ venience.—The said two Courts shall together ami-
“ cably fix a competent term for the duration of that
“ business.”

ARTICLE XIX.

“ All the countries and territories which may have
“ been, or which may be, conquered in any part of the
“ world whatsoever, by the arms of his Britannic Ma-
“ jesty, or by those of his most Christian Majesty, and
“ which are not included in the present articles, shall
“ be restored without difficulty, and without requiring
“ compensation.”

ARTICLE XX.

“ As it is necessary to assign a fixed epoch for the
“ restitutions and the evacuations to be made by each

P

“ of

enquire into the state of commerce between the two nations, in order to settle
new

“ of the high contracting parties, it is agreed, that the
“ King of Great Britain shall cause to be evacuated the
“ Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, three months after
“ the ratification of the Definitive Treaty, or sooner
“ if it can be done ; St. Lucia in the West Indies, and
“ Gorée in Africa, three months after the ratification
“ of the Definitive Treaty, or sooner if it can be done.
“ The King of Great Britain shall, in like manner, at
“ the end of three months after the ratification of the
“ Definitive Treaty, or sooner if it can be done, enter
“ again into possession of the Islands of Grenada, the
“ Grenadines, St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Christopher's, Nevis, and Montserrat.

“ France shall be put into possession of the towns and
“ comptoirs, which are restored to her in the East Indies,
“ and of the territories which are procured for her, to
“ serve as dependencies round Pondicherry, and round
“ Karical, six months after the ratification of the Definitive Treaty, or sooner if it can be done.

“ France shall, at the end of the same term of six
“ months, restore the towns and territories which her
“ arms may have taken from the English or their allies
“ in the East Indies.

“ In consequence whereof, the necessary orders shall
“ be sent by each of the high contracting parties, with
“ reciprocal passports for the ships which shall carry
“ them, immediately after the ratification of the Definitive Treaty.

ARTI-

new arrangements of trade, does not merely comprize words of course, but that it carries in it a real and important mean-

ARTICLE XXI.

“ The prisoners made respectively by the arms of his Britannic Majesty, and his most Christian Majesty, by land and by sea, shall be restored reciprocally, and *bona fide*, immediately after the ratification of the Definitive Treaty, without ransom, and on paying the debts they may have contracted during their captivity; and each crown shall respectively reimburse the sums which shall have been advanced for the subsistence and maintenance of their prisoners, by the Sovereign of the country where they shall have been detained, according to the receipts and attested accounts, and other authentic titles which shall be produced on each side.”

ARTICLE XXII.

“ In order to prevent all causes of complaint and dispute which may arise on account of prizes which may be made at sea after the signing of these Preliminary Articles, it is reciprocally agreed, that the vessels and effects, which may be taken in the Channel and the North Seas, after the space of twelve days, to be computed from the ratification of the present Preliminary Articles, shall be restored on each side. That the term shall be one month from the Channel and North

meaning. It has long been my opinion that our commercial intercourse with France might be placed on a far more liberal footing than it hath heretofore been, and adjusted upon terms much more advantageous to both countries. If, therefore, we should have wise and able ministers at the head of our affairs, a matter of such consequence will not, I trust, be neglected.

THE Preliminary Articles † with Spain

“ Seas, as far as the Canary Islands, inclusively, whether in the Ocean or in the Mediterranean. Two months from the said Canary Islands, as far as the Equinoctial line or Equator; and lastly, five months in all other parts of the World, without any exception or any more particular description of time and place.

ARTICLE XXIII.

“ The ratification of the present Preliminary Articles, shall be expedited in good and due form, and exchanged in the space of one month, or sooner if it can be done, to be computed from the day of the signature of the present Articles.”

† ARTICLE I.

“ As soon as the Preliminary Articles shall be signed and ratified, sincere friendship shall be established between
“ tween

Spain will not demand so large a discussion as those I have already considered. The first object in them which presents itself to notice, is the stipulation of the second article, ‡ that his Catholic Majesty shall keep the Island of Minorca. As the Spaniards had gotten Fort St. Philip's from us by conquest, it might be expected that they would insist upon retaining it; and it is one of the least misfortunes to which we have been subjected by an unsuccessful war. Not to men-

“ tween his Britannic Majesty and his Catholic Majesty, their kingdoms, states, and subjects, by sea and
 “ by land, in all parts of the world. Orders shall be
 “ sent to the armies and squadrons, as well as to the
 “ subjects of the two powers, to stop all hostilities, and
 “ to live in the most perfect union, forgetting what is
 “ past, of which their Sovereigns give them the order
 “ and example: And for the execution of this article,
 “ sea-passes shall be given on each side, for the ships
 “ which shall be dispatched to carry the news of it to
 “ the possessions of the said powers.”

‡ ARTICLE II.

“ His Catholic Majesty shall keep the Island of
 “ Minorca.”

tion that we are delivered from the vast expence of maintaining an island from which proportionable advantages have not been derived ; there are able and official men, that have long been acquainted with Minerca, who do not scruple to assert, that it hath been a most unprofitable millstone about the neck of Great Britain. They say, that, notwithstanding the character of St. Philip's Castle, and the mountains of money which unhappily have been laid out upon it, to the no small satisfaction of engineers, it is a fortress incapable of defence ; and that, were it as strong as the expences it has put this country to would lead the public to suppose, it does not command the harbour—does not protect our arsenals—nor our careening places—nor any thing.—That the island cannot, in a time of war, be of much service, or be rendered capable of standing against the force either of France or Spain, hath been twice experienced since it came
into

into our possession. In a time of peace, it may, though in the hands of the Spaniards, be rendered, by treaty, a place where our commercial ships may obtain, if needful, supplies of water and provisions.

THE third article, * which cedes to the King of Spain East Florida, and permits him to keep the possession of West

* ARTICLE III.

“ His Britannic Majesty shall cede to his Catholic Majesty East Florida, and his Catholic Majesty shall keep West Florida, provided that the term of eighteen months, to be computed from the time of the ratification of the Definitive Treaty, shall be granted to the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, who are settled as well in the Island of Minorca as the two Floridas, to sell their estates, recover their debts, and to transport their effects, as well as their persons, without being restrained on account of their religion, or under any other pretence whatsoever, except that of debts and criminal prosecutions: And his Britannic Majesty shall have power to cause all the effects that may belong to him in East Florida, whether artillery or others, to be carried away.”

Florida,

Florida, may be thought liable to greater objections. though the Spanish Monarch might insist upon retaining West Florida, because it had come under subjection to him by the right of conquest, it may be asked, why should East Florida be added to the bargain? If no other answer could be given to the question, it might be replied, that the surrender of this province, as well as other concessions, ought to be put down to the account of those men, who, by their mistaken and ruinous policy, had brought the nation under the unhappy necessity of treating with its enemies upon very different terms from what it had formerly in its power to command. However, the restoration of the Islands of Providence and the Bahamas, may be considered as some compensation for the loss of East Florida. To this it may be added, that it is not a country of any great value, either by its produce or its commerce. The advantages of it have lately

lately been magnified; but a different account of it is given by men who are well informed upon the subject. One thing is certain, that the expence to Government of maintaining East and West Florida, has vastly exceeded any benefits that ever have arisen, or were ever likely to arise from the possession of these two provinces. The charges incurred for the service of East Florida in three years, between the first of January 1779, and the first of January 1782, amounted to three hundred and sixty-eight thousand pounds; the annual average of which is one hundred and twenty-two thousand six hundred and sixty-six pounds thirteen shillings and four-pence. The expences of West Florida, within the same period, arose to a much larger sum. The amount, for three years, was one million two hundred and fourteen thousand two hundred and fifty pounds, the annual average of which is four hundred and four thousand seven hundred

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and fifty pounds. The yearly average, therefore, of the charges of the two Floridas, taken together, is five hundred and twenty-seven thousand four hundred and sixteen pounds thirteen shillings and fourpence; and it is to be remembered, that, in this estimate, the whole of the military establishment, at least with regard to East Florida, is not included.* I may safely appeal to the understanding of any well-informed reader, whether the imports and exports of these provinces, and much less the profits of them, have borne any proportion to the burthen with which the maintenance and support of them have loaded this kingdom. It appears, therefore, that their being in the hands of Spain is not so highly disadvantageous as some persons may have been led to apprehend; and when we reflect upon the sloth and inactivity of the Spanish Government, we shall be well satisfied that there is no power which would be so little

* Appendix, No. III.

likely

likely to convert the Floridas to the detriment of Great Britain. If we had continued to possess them, and they had become, in a course of years, as flourishing as a warm imagination may suppose, they might, perhaps, have been desirous of uniting with the Thirteen States, and thus have been the source of future contests. This may be regarded not only as a possible, but as a highly probable contingency. It would be impracticable to hinder such a collision of events, as would interrupt, and, perhaps in the end, totally destroy the harmony of the English and the Americans.

THE fourth article * very properly stipulates for the liberty of cutting logwood,
and

* ARTICLE IV.

“ His Catholic Majesty shall not for the future suffer
“ the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, or their work-
“ men, to be disturbed or molested, under any pretence
“ whatsoever, in their occupation of cutting, loading,
Q² “ and

and places that matter on its former footing. Such regulations will, without doubt, be made upon this head, as shall secure to British subjects all the advantages, with regard to so valuable a material of our manufactures and commerce, which the nation had a right to expect.

For this purpose some particular district must be fixed upon, in which our logwood-cutters shall be allowed to exercise their employment without molestation; and it is to be hoped, that the gentlemen who conclude the definitive treaty,

“ and carrying away logwood, in a district of which the
 “ boundaries shall be fixed; and for this purpose, they
 “ may build without hindrance, and occupy without interruption, the houses and magazines necessary for
 “ them, for their families, and for their effects, in a
 “ place to be agreed upon, either in the Definitive
 “ Treaty, or within six months after the exchange of
 “ the ratifications; and his said Catholic Majesty assures to them, by this article, the entire enjoyment of what is above stipulated; provided that these
 “ stipulations shall not be considered as derogatory in
 “ any respect from the rights of his sovereignty.”

treaty, will take care that the territory be ample and large, answerably to the idea originally formed.

CONCERNING the restorations provided for by the fifth article*, I have already observed, that they are some compensation for the cession of East Florida. It may farther be remarked, that the island of Providence is advantageously situated for being serviceable to the homeward-bound ships from Jamaica.

If, after all, we have been obliged to make some concessions to Spain, which we should gladly have avoided, let it be recollected-

* ARTICLE V.

" His Catholic Majesty shall restore to Great Britain the islands of Providence and the Bahamas, without exception, in the same condition in which they were when they were conquered by the arms of the King of Spain." The 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th preliminary articles with Spain, are the same as the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d preliminary articles with France. The provisional treaty with America was signed on the 30th of November, 1782, and the preliminary articles with France and Spain on the 20th of January, 1783.

recollected that we have retained Gibraltar. Had this been given up, we might have had, in exchange for it, very valuable compensations. But it did not suit with the temper of the people of England, that Gibraltar should be delivered up to the Spaniards for any consideration whatever. The almost unexampled skill and bravery with which it had been defended and relieved, had given it an inestimable value in the eyes of our countrymen. The pride of the nation could not bear that it should be sacrificed, after it had stood so illustrious a siege, had exhibited such prodigies of valour, and been preserved with such amazing exertions. This pride was wisely consulted by government, and Gibraltar hath been kept by us, though, otherwise, many circumstances would have justified its being exchanged for something intrinsically more useful. It ought, therefore, not to be esteemed blameable, but highly meritorious in the ministers of the crown, that, by some concessions of another

another kind, they have gratified the public with respect to the retention of an object which was deemed of the greatest importance to the national interest and glory.

BUT though it was prudent and laudable in administration to pay a regard to the opinion of the kingdom in this point, there were very weighty reasons of a different kind for the conduct which has been pursued. Supposing that the Ministry, by giving up Gibraltar, might have had the restitution of all which Spain had conquered, and one of the capital French islands into the bargain, and that the consequence had been the possession of Tobago, as well as Dominica and the other islands, still the affair must have been transacted through the medium of France; and it would have been impossible to have brought any exchange to bear, which would not have terminated in procuring to the French the other half of St. Domingo.

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This must have given them such a decided superiority in the sugar trade as would have ended in a monopoly of that commerce. It would likewise have been the means of drawing large sums of money from this country, for the purchase of estates in any great ceded island; whilst the original proprietors of that island would carry their properties to cultivate the richer soil of Hispaniola. The English, in the mean while, would feel still more severely the mischiefs that had been experienced in regard to Grenada, and at a time too in which we are less able to suffer such a drain. The Ministry, therefore, acted with a wise and manly firmness, in standing the complaints which must necessarily result from actual cessions, in order to preserve Gibraltar. If ever hereafter it should be found expedient give up that fortress to the Spaniards, it will be of the highest importance to us to do it without the interference of France, and to render it the means of detaching Spain from the family compact,

compact, and of restoring that country to its natural alliance with England.

As the preliminary articles of peace with the Dutch are not yet published or ratified, and perhaps not finally settled, I cannot speak of them with that certainty which I hoped to have done. It is, however, sufficiently known that Trincomale is to be restored. I am fully sensible that it is the finest harbour in the East Indies, and that, if it could be retained by us, it would be a most valuable acquisition. But a little reflection will convince us that no such event was to be expected. The states of Holland could never have been brought to submit to a concession so repugnant to their interest and honour: and in their demand of the restitution of Trincomale, they are supported by all the influence and power of France, and by the interests of Europe in general. It would be found impossible to engage the French to for-

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sake that republic in a matter of such
 great importance. The war of England
 with the Dutch was entered upon precipi-
 tately, harshly, and if I were to add
 unjustly, I should deliver the sentiments
 of many wise and good men in this
 country. Considering, therefore, the
 violent manner in which we have acted
 towards them, to have insisted upon the
 retention of Trincomale, even if we
 could have enforced our possession of it,
 could scarcely have been defended, either
 on the principles of equity or policy.
 With regard to policy at least, we may
 safely assert, that it would have been
 very unwise to have irritated for ever
 against us a people with whom we have
 been so long and naturally connected,
 whose commerce, alliance, and friend-
 ship have always been of the greatest
 service to us, and which, under pru-
 dent management, may continue to be
 so in future times. But the union would
 perhaps irrecoverably have been broken,
 if

if we had refused to have obliged them in the article of Trincomale.

But if we have consented to the cession of Trincomale, it is to be remembered, that the Cape of Good Hope is to be restored by the French to the Dutch. This is a circumstance of eminent advantage to the commerce of England. The East Indies would comparatively be of little benefit without the use of the Cape. It is the key to that part of the world; and without the aid derived from it, our voyages would be very slow and inconvenient. If the Cape, and the territory belonging to it, were to remain in the hands of France, every one must be sensible, that many evils would hence accrue to this country. Besides the general utility in respect to provision, watering, repairs, and a resting-place for their ships, which the French would derive from being masters of the Cape of Good Hope, they would hereby be

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exceedingly

exceedingly strengthened in their attempts to acquire fresh power in the East Indies. The English, on the other hand, would be proportionably weakened, and lose those means of refreshment and supply they have so long enjoyed. But by the Cape's reverting to our old ally, these disadvantages will be prevented, and every thing be placed upon its former natural and salutary foundation.

I understand, likewise, that Negapatnam is to be ceded to Great Britain, and that some commercial stipulations of the highest importance have been made, which it would be premature to enter upon at present, but which, when they come to be known, will fully justify the preliminary articles with the Dutch. As it may fall upon a different set of gentlemen to complete the affair, I hope that they will pursue it with attention and zeal. It is certainly of the greatest consequence to remove the causes of jealousy
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and dissention which have arisen betwixt us and Holland, to detach that country from too close a connection with France, and to restore to England and the Seven United Provinces, the confidence, alliance, and friendship, which, with a few interruptions, have for more than two centuries subsisted between them.

I have now examined the provisional treaty with America, and the preliminary articles of peace with France and Spain : and it appears that more may be said for the particular stipulations of them, than might, on a cursory view, be imagined ; and that they are by no means so dishonourable or disgraceful as inattention, ignorance, and private and selfish views have represented. But if, after all, it should still be thought unpleasant to have given way in some points which affect the pride of the nation, on whom is this to be charged ? Not surely on the ministry who consented to do it, but on
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the men by whom the kingdom was reduced to the unhappy condition of submitting to terms, which, in the season of its prosperity, it might have resisted with firmness. The peace, so far as it is disagreeable in any respect, has not been made so by Lord Shelburne, and his colleagues in office, but by the administration which carried on the obstinate and fatal war with America, and raised against the nation a host of foreign enemies. It was produced by the necessity to which *they* had brought the public of giving up the contest, or of rushing forward to inevitable destruction. What there is of good in the Treaty, (and that there is much good in it has fully been shewn) we owe to the ability, the attention, and the exertions of the men by whom it hath been so speedily and happily accomplished. It is scarcely a year since almost every voice was loud for putting an end to the war on any terms; and it would not at that time have easily
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been imagined that peace could be obtained by concessions so comparatively small and insignificant. If it could have been thus purchased, it would have been deemed an event devoutly to be wished. What gratitude, then, what justice can there be in complaining of that which we so lately regarded as infinitely desirable, and indeed absolutely necessary? There is no reason to believe that peace could have been procured on better terms. It is certain that the conditions on which it hath been settled, were the ultimatum of our enemies. If the Ministry had refused to accede to these conditions; if, rather than do it, they had determined to protract the war; if they had continued to expose us to the difficulties, dangers, and calamities by which we were surrounded; then, and then only, would they have been entitled to censure, disgrace, and punishment.

THE nation already begins to feel the blessings of peace. The good consequences

quences of it were immediately experienced, by the bulk of the people, not only in the reduced prices of several articles of consumption, and especially in the great fall of coals and sugar, but in many other respects. Industry and commerce have assumed a different and far more joyous appearance. The manufactures lift up their heads, and orders for goods are spreading through every quarter of the kingdom. The woollen manufacture in particular, hath revived in an astonishing degree. So low were those parts of it brought down which are carried on in Norfolk, Essex, and Suffolk, and so small, in consequence of it, was the demand for long wool, that the counties in which it grows, have been earnestly solicitous to have the exportation of it permitted by law. But no such scheme is now necessary. The wool of those counties, to the great relief and consolation both of the graziers and land-owners, hath arisen double in value.

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NOTWITHSTANDING the clamours which have been attempted to be raised against the peace, is there a man among us, who, without regard to private purposes, wishes for the continuance of the war? Is there a man who seriously thinks that more advantageous terms were to be expected? Is there a man who can lay his hand upon his heart, and, looking to God and his country, assert, that he wishes the nation to be again involved in its contest with France and Spain, with Holland and America? If there be those who make light of such a confederacy; if there be those who not only imagine that a better Treaty might have been negotiated, but that the terms agreed upon were so inadequate to what we had reason to expect, that the renewal of hostilities would have been more eligible than to have yielded to the conditions we have complied with; if there be politicians who fancy that, in going on for a campaign or two longer, we should have met with nothing but victory, and that we

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should

should entirely have beaten the fleets and armies of our enemies ; let me be permitted to tell them, that nothing can be so idle and groundless as imaginations of this kind, and that to have acted upon them would have been the height of folly and infatuation. What little reason there could be to prefer the continuance of the war to the peace which has been obtained, will appear to a demonstration, if we advert to the state of our army, the state of our navy, and the state of our finances.

IF the war had been persisted in, the army must have been kept up to its full establishment. Great part of it must still have been retained in the American provinces ; for though we might only have continued there upon the defensive, a large force would, nevertheless, have been necessary even for that purpose ; and who could tell what causes might have occurred, to provoke offensive operations ? If we had attempted to carry on any important expeditions against the West India Islands,

Islands, or against the Spanish territories in South America, nothing of this kind could have taken place, and the empire have been sufficiently guarded in other respects, unless our regiments had been complete. But is it generally known how defective the condition of the army was in point of numbers? More than twenty-five thousand men were wanting to render the establishment effective: but how such a supply of troops could have been obtained, is beyond the ablest of our commanders to say. In fact, the recruiting service had become desperate. Those who conduct our military affairs, are the most sensible how impracticable it was, during the last campaign, to undertake any great enterprize, and that this impracticability would have been more strongly felt in the succeeding year.

THE victory of Lord Rodney, and the defence and relief of Gibraltar, have been warmly insisted upon, as having raised the kingdom to a far higher situation

than that in which it stood previously to these events. No Englishman can wish to detract from the value of such illustrious exploits. They were equally honourable and useful, contributing, in an eminent degree, to the glory and benefit of the nation ; and the public gratitude and applause will ever attend a Rodney, a Howe, and an Elliot, for the signal services they have performed to their country. But the importance of the actions performed by these illustrious commanders, lies in their having been the means of our preservation, and not in their enabling us to engage in expeditions of conquest. They have rescued us from danger, and distress, and ruin ; but they have not put us into the condition of prosecuting the war with any assurances or hopes of final success. Their prime merit has been in giving us to stand upon higher ground, in the late negotiation ; and, perhaps, had it not been for these successes, we could not have obtained peace at all ; or, if it had been

obtained, it must have been on terms very hurtful to the feelings of the public.

PARTICULAR stress has been laid on the flourishing state of our navy. That it is in so respectable a condition, I sincerely rejoice ; but still it is not equal to that of our combined enemies. As fleets are always in a fluctuating state, it is difficult precisely to ascertain, at least for any considerable period of time, their exact situation and number. There is, however, the best authority before the public for saying, that, on the 31st of December, 1782, the ships of the line, capable of service, or which would soon be ready for it, belonging to Great Britain, amounted only to ninety-nine, whilst those of Spain, France and Holland were, at least, a hundred and twenty-six. * It is to be feared that this calculation is below the mark, on the side of the enemy ; for other great authorities make their combined fleet to be nearly a hundred

* Appendix, No. IV.

and fifty. † Against such a superiority of force it would not have been easy to contend; especially as the Dutch would not probably have longer continued inactive. Their fleet was, at length, brought into a good condition, and would have afforded a formidable aid to France and Spain. Would it not, then, have been madness to have refused peace upon the bare chance of coming off victorious, against three of the greatest naval powers in Europe?

BUT supposing that the British navy had been stronger and more numerous than in fact it is, were we sure of obtaining every success which a sanguine imagination might presume to expect? Those know little of history who think that decisive battles can be brought on at pleasure. The opportunities of great naval engagements seldom occur; and the victories gained by Lord Rodney were partly owing to accidentally meeting

† Appendix, No. V.

with

with the enemy. If the war had been continued, it would not have been in our power to have obliged the fleets of our enemies to fight us when and where we had chosen. The commanders of them, by the proper management of winds and tides, could avoid being forced to a battle, contrary to their inclinations. If to windward, they have the option of their distance ; and if to leeward, they have the advantage of a cannonade of twenty minutes, without return, before our ships can close ; in which space of time many of our vessels would be crippled in masts, sails, yards, and rigging. They have only to make sail, and keep clear of a close action ; and how much this is in their own choice, hath been proved, in various instances, during the present war. In short, it is incontrovertably true, that two fleets of equal force, ably commanded, may be a month in sight of each other, without producing a decisive event, unless the chiefs on both sides are equally

equally determined to fight it out; nor is a decisive event always, or generally, the result of naval engagements, as hath been sufficiently experienced in the late war. Thus another and another summer might have been wasted to no purpose, and many millions of money have been spent in vain.

THE state of our finances, and the prodigious expence which would have attended the continuance of the war, are objects of the most serious consideration. Would it have been worth while to have incurred the certainty of spending twenty or thirty millions, rather than to have agreed to the present peace? Some men there are, who have a ridiculous notion, that because the nation has so long sustained an accumulation of debt, it will sustain it for ever. But every thing that is human must necessarily be finite. Though persons may be mistaken in supposing that a kingdom cannot go beyond certain limits, there are, nevertheless,
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boundaries which can never be passed without destruction. If a nation, like an individual, continually spends more than its income, its revenues will at last be exhausted. Without pretending to foretell how long our resources might hold out, it is sufficient to say, that they have been tried too much to expose them to future hazard.

THE national debt, on the 5th of January, 1783, (I speak from good information) funded and unfunded, amounted to two hundred and forty-seven millions three hundred and twenty thousand nine hundred and twenty-one pounds. Of this the funded debt is two hundred and twenty-two millions eight hundred and two thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pounds. The unfunded debt is twenty-four millions five hundred and eighteen thousand four hundred and ninety-three pounds. The yearly interest of the funded debt, including the sum annually paid for annuities on lives,

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and including also the charge for management, is seven millions four hundred and eighty-two thousand five hundred and forty-two pounds. The annual interest of that part of the unfunded debt which carries interest, is six hundred and sixty-seven thousand and seven hundred and twenty-seven pounds. The total of the yearly interest on the national debt, is eight millions one hundred and fifty thousand two hundred and sixty-nine pounds. Other calculations, by very skilful men, do not diminish, but increase, these sums. The supplies that will be requisite for the present year are estimated at nineteen millions seven hundred and seventy thousand pounds. Need I ask, whether such an enormous debt be not a most dreadful burthen upon the public? Invention itself is almost wearied out in fixing upon new modes of taxation, and every fresh tax contributes to render the old ones less efficient. Was this a period to protract the war; to protract it in the hopes of gaining advantages highly impro-

improbable, perhaps impossible, to be gained ; to protract it only to be reduced to a more deplorable situation, with an accumulated load on ourselves and our posterity ? Whatever ignorance, pride, or faction, may dictate, peace was absolutely necessary, and the acquisition of it should be matter of thankfulness and congratulation.

THE more the subject is reflected upon, the more strong and numerous will the reasons appear against the continuance of the war. Circumstances might be mentioned, which, perhaps, it would be improper to disclose ; and it is much to the honour of Ministry that they have not, even for the sake of their own vindication, under all the incentives of irritation and attack, had recourse to every argument that might have been brought to justify their conduct. Their conduct, however, may be amply justified, from what it is almost in every

man's power to know and to observe. If it were necessary still farther to enlarge upon the matter, I might desire my readers to consider, that the risques we ran during the last campaign; the lateness with which our navy could be gotten ready for action; the danger to which our Baltic fleet was long exposed; the season's being past for an expedition against South America; the impossibility of removing the troops from New York time enough for any attempt in the West Indies, before the bad weather set in; the impracticability, acknowledged by every General and every Admiral, of giving success to enterprizes in sight of an equal, much less a superior fleet; the variety and distance of the places we had to defend; the remoteness of the objects of attack; and the certain prospect of these difficulties being rather increased than diminished in the present year, all loudly called upon Government to make no delay in the restoration of peace.

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These were causes sufficient to animate the zeal of our rulers in securing to us that blessing, even if there had been no want of discipline in our armies and navies, no backwardness in the public service, no spirit of mutiny to clog the operations of war, and weaken the ardour for military glory. When to these circumstances are added the general facts, of the daily multiplication of our enemies by the neutral league; the increase of our internal divisions; the lessening of our revenue by civil contests, losses, and taxes; the diminution of our fleet by storms and perpetual wear, faster than it could be replaced; the power which our adversaries had to avoid fighting with us, whenever it suited their own views; the unhealthiness of particular stations, and the dislike that was taken to them; the decrease of sea captures; the unsuitableness of our country to the raising and maintaining a large landed force; the confinement of the mercenaries to America;

rica ; the slowness with which possessions could be won, if they could be won at all ; the extreme hazard to which Jamaica, infinitely the most valuable of our islands, was exposed ; and the national distress that would arise from its being the seat of hostilities ; it requires no great depth of understanding to say, that peace was indispensably necessary to the kingdom. It was indispensably necessary to divide our enemies, if not to re-unite ourselves, and re-attach America, before the French were established in it, and England forgotten there. Who could hesitate a moment about quitting a fatal contest, giving up names, and consenting to lose a slight matter of revenue ; where, too, the expence of retaining an acquisition might be far above the advantage it would produce ? Wars rarely pay for themselves ; certainly not equal wars ; much less losing wars ; undoubtedly not wars for Colonies ; least of all wars for future Colonies :

nies : for it would have been a war for future Colonies, if we had persisted in the quarrel with the Americans, for the sake of the Canada boundaries and the Back Settlements.

AFTER having produced such a variety of arguments in justification of the peace, and being convinced, as I certainly am, of the many advantages with which it is attended, it would be natural for me to launch out in the praises of those, who, in a season of general dependency, when the Government was reduced so low by a bad administration, assumed the direction of affairs, and have done so much in so little a time. But the writer of these sheets is the advocate of measures, not of men. He can truly say, that he hath not acted from personal attachments and motives, but from the full conviction of his understanding and conscience, and from the desire and hope of contributing
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something to the public good. It is the duty of every citizen, who is capable of it, to enlighten the minds of his countrymen upon subjects of national importance. Since the old edifice is necessarily destroyed, by the unavoidable separation of Great Britain and America, we should exert ourselves to the utmost of our power, that the new one may be founded in justice, in union, and in general conviction. Its superstructure depends upon it, and the inhabitants of the kingdom will be more or less active, in proportion to the confidence they have in its wisdom and stability. It behoves those who made it, to recommend themselves to the public by promoting the principles of it, whether in or out of Government. These are a cordial intercourse with North America; a well-grounded hope, first of returning affection, and then of returning union; and an universal freedom of commerce. It becomes those who objected to the peace
equally

equally to adhere to these principles. If we are so happy as to recover the confidence of our American brethren, the trade is sure to follow. If we are so wise as to profit by experience, and to send liberal laws to our remaining Colonies, instead of troops, bad governors, and machiavelian systems, we shall be freed from the burthen of transmitting large sums thither, which we can no longer afford, and shall receive considerably from thence in return, by the necessary balance of our commerce. If we have resolution enough to open our ports at home, and to make Great Britain and Ireland, what Nature and Providence intended them for, a magazine between the old and new world, between the north and south of Europe; and if strict œconomical regulations be adopted, without loss of time, in every department, we may still find a substitute for all that we have given up, and be more at our command, by being within ourselves.

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BUT if we revert to past principles ; if we continue to go on upon the idea of narrow monopoly ; if we are afraid to trust our commerce to the greatness of our capital, the superior skill of our manufacturers, and the singular advantages of our insular situation ; if, abandoning these benefits, we attempt to force particular branches by high imposts and prohibitions, which must alienate Europe, and clog our great objects of export at foreign markets ; if we add, indiscriminately, five per cent. to five per cent. upon our customs and excise, and depend, for the collection of them, on our armies, and on laws which are a reproach to human nature ; if we have not the resolution to shift the duties from articles of active trade to those of luxury and home consumption ; if, with the example of the Dutch before our eyes, we persist in hampering our navigation, which ought to be free as air ; if sine-cures are to be supported, and the
first

first nobility of the land are to hold places of high profit, without any services annexed to them ; if fees are to be upheld as a necessary incentive to the relaxed state of office, and one merchant is to bid against another, for having that business expedited which the smallest, as well as the greatest, by every rule of law as well as policy, are entitled to have dispatched without perquisite or gratuity of any kind ; if we return to the miserable maxim of increasing the capital of our debt, in order to lessen the odium of our taxes, and thus rivet that debt, enormous as it is, upon our shoulders ; above all, if we suffer the revenue, the military, the navy, the morals of the people, and even the service of Religion, to be sacrificed to the purpose of electing a House of Commons, the members of which, in contradiction to the general sense of the nation, are afterwards to disturb the executive course of Government, from evident motives of ambition, or selfish-

ness, or personal resentment, and without the semblance of public virtue ;—is there much presumption in saying, *Actum est de Republicâ*? He that runs may read that we are in no circumstances which will afford the continuance of such corruption. We are already nearly worn out by it, and it is high time to recur to a better system. Every man must unite in endeavouring to get rid of a false Government, that we may know what security we have for our persons, our industry, and our properties, and what Constitution we are to hand down to posterity. It is but justice to acknowledge, from the declarations contained in the King's speech, that those who made the peace considered it only as the first act of their administration, and the ground of all the rest of their exertions for the safety, improvement, honour, and prosperity of their country. It is incumbent on those who succeed them to adopt the same enlarged and patriotic views, and to make this the sole

object of contention, who shall most effectually contribute to rescue the nation from impending evils, and to render it flourishing and happy for many future ages. This is the only emulation that can give lustre to their characters, the only ambition with which able and honourable men, who have it in their power to be of service to Great Britain, ought to be inspired.

APPEN-

A P P E N D I X, N^o. I.

Expences of the Province of CANADA, from the 1st June 1776, to the 24th October 1782, so far as the same can be estimated at the Treasury.

Ordinary Expences of the Army.

Amount of warrants granted by the commanders in chief for the ordinary services of the army, from 1st June 1776 to 13th May, 1777		£.	s.	d.
—	—	85,980	0	0
Ditto from 13th May to 24th Oct. 1777	—	37,412	2	11
Ditto ——— to 11th Nov. 1777	—	2,347	12	3½
Ditto ——— to 1st July 1778	—	25,899	16	6
Ditto from 1st July to 3d Oct. 1778	—	13,751	6	8½
Ditto from 3d Oct. to 17th Nov. 1778	—	15,294	14	11

Ditto from 1st July to 3d Oct. 1778 — — 13,751 6 8½
 Ditto from 3d Oct. to 17th Nov. 1778 — — 15,294 14 11

Ditto from 18th Nov. 1778 to 8th Sept. 1779	39,146	6	3½
Ditto from 8th Sept. to 24th Oct. 1779	10,061	17	9
Ditto from 28th Oct. 1779 to 6th July 1780	45,185	2	0½
Ditto from 7th July to 24th Oct. 1780	36,065	16	4½
Ditto from 24th Oct. to 21st Nov. 1780	11,607	6	1½
Ditto from 21st Nov. 1780 to 23d Oct. 1781	54,676	16	11½
Ditto from 26th Oct. 1781 to 24th Oct. 1782	93,919	14	3½
	<u>£.471,348</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>2½</u>

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In addition to this sum must be added the amount of what was
 issued here for off-reckonings and clearings for the troops in
 Canada. This cannot be accurately ascertained, but will
 amount to about one third of the above sum — — —
 General officers, staff, and hospital pay for six years and four
 months, at 9461l. 5s. per annum — — —

157,116 0 0
 59,921 5 0

Extraordinary Expences of the Army.

Amount of warrants granted by the commanders in chief for extraordinary, viz.				
From 1st June 1776 to 1st May 1777	—	292,523	18	2
1st May to 23d Oct. 1777	—	258,977	10	8½
24th Oct. 1777 to 26th June 1778	—	226,286	12	6½
27th June to 1st Oct. 1778	—	41,401	13	9
1st Oct. to 18th Nov. 1778	—	79,973	16	2½
18th Nov. 1778 to 11th Sept. 1779	—	279,350	2	7
11th Sept. 1779 to 23d Oct. 1779	—	143,631	6	4½
24th Oct. 1779 to 4th July 1780	—	161,945	3	1
4th July 1780 to 25th Oct. 1780	—	149,643	0	1½
25th Oct. 1780 to 21st Nov. 1780	—	37,964	3	11½
22d Nov. 1780 to 23d Oct. 1781	—	639,841	0	7½
25th Oct. 1781 to 24th Oct. 1782	—	407,051	1	11½
		<hr/>		
		£.2,718,589	10	1

Provisions

Provisions for the Army in Canada, sent
from England and Ireland, viz.

In 1776, 16 months provisions for 12,000 men, at $5\frac{1}{4}$ a ration	—	—	127,575	0	0
In 1777, 12 months ditto for 12,000 men, at $5\frac{3}{4}$			104,937	10	0
In 1778, 12 months ditto for 10,000 men, at $7\frac{3}{4}$			112,161	9	2
X In 1779, 12 months ditto for 10,360 men; and 18 months ditto for 3021, at $5\frac{3}{4}$			129,866	5	9
In 1780, 18 months ditto for 15,000, at $5\frac{1}{4}$			192,562	10	0
In 1781, 18 months ditto for 15,000, at $5\frac{3}{4}$			199,417	19	$4\frac{1}{2}$
In 1782, 12 months ditto for 12,000, at $5\frac{1}{4}$			100,000	0	0
			<hr/>	966,620	14 $3\frac{1}{2}$
				518	

Cloathing

Provisions

Clothing, Stores, and Indian Presents
sent from Great Britain, viz.

Oct. 1775 and Aug. 1776, cloathing for 6000 Ca- nadians — —	18,690	4	9
Oct. 1776, sundry stores	26,919	15	0
Apr. 1778, Indian presents	14,210	4	1
Feb. 1779, camp equipage, cloathing, &c. —	9,232	14	4
August 1779, naval stores	12,863	2	4
May 1779, Indian presents	15,265	13	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
May 1780, Ditto —	13,024	10	6
May 1781, Naval stores	11,377	13	6
June 1781, Indian presents	38,743	7	5
August 1782, Ditto —	63,861	17	7
Sept. 1782, Sundry stores	3,921	5	3
	228,180	8	2 $\frac{1}{2}$

It

It is not possible to ascertain the expence of the transports employed in carrying provisions, stores, and Indian presents to Canada, that service being so much mixed with services of the like nature : but it is supposed to have amounted, in freight, demurrage, and risk, to at least 50 per cent. on the value of the articles — — — — —

597,400 0 0

4,510,790 12 7

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X Civil Establishment and Contingencies.

From 1st May 1776 to 31st Oct. 1776	—	11,956	1	0
1st Nov. 1776 to 30th April 1777	—	11,622	15	9
1st May 1777 to 31st Oct. 1777	—	11,750	0	0
1st Nov. 1777 to 30th April 1778	—	12,621	2	4½
1st May 1778 to 31st Oct. 1778	—	13,016	7	0
1st Nov. 1778 to 30th April 1779	—	10,772	16	11½
1st May 1779 to 31st Oct. 1779	—	14,017	17	11

1st.

1st Nov. 1779 to 30th April 1780	—	11,453	18	7
1st May 1780 to 31st Oct. 1780	—	11,104	5	1½
1st Nov. 1780 to 30th April 1781	—	12,594	7	6½
1st May 1781 to 31st Oct. 1781	—	11,842	8	5

The two half-yearly accounts to 30th April 1782, and 31st Oct. 1782, are not yet received; but taking them at the same sum as the two preceding half years, they will amount to — —

24,436	16	0
157,188	16	9

From which deduct

Provincial duties from 1st

May 1776 to the 10th of

October 1782 — — 47,990 2 0

Licences to tavern-keepers,

&c. from Ditto to Ditto 3,496 13 0

Casual

£. 5,299,519 19 6 $\frac{1}{2}$

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Which for 6 years and 4 months is — — — — — £. 836,766 6 3 per annum

CANADA

CANADA Imports and Exports for several distinct Years.

	Imports. £.	Exports. £.	Imports Excess. £.	Exports Excess. £.
In 1763	—	149,539	—	122,683
1768	—	110,598	—	73,436
1773	—	316,867	—	274,473
1778	—	555,061	—	481,630
1781	—	422,807	—	374,259

A P P E N D I X N^o. II.

TOBAGO Imports and Exports for several distinct Years.

	Imports. £.	Exports. £.	Imports Excess. £.	Exports Excess. £.
In 1763	—	—	—	—
1768	—	—	—	—
1773	—	—	—	—
1778	—	—	—	—
1781	—	—	—	—

1778	—	95,284	—	22,833	—	72,451	—	...
1781	—	29,330	—	14,442	—	14,887	—	...

APPENDIX N^o. III.

EAST FLORIDA

Expences incurred for the Service of the Province in Three Years between the 1st of January 1779 and the 1st of January 1782.

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Bills drawn by the governor	—	—	52,400	0	0
Bills drawn by the barrack-master	—	—	18,800	0	0
Provisions, and charges of freight, &c.	—	—	284,100	0	0
Civil establishment	—	—	12,700	0	0
Amount of 3 years	—	—	368,000	0	0
Annual average	—	—	£. 122,666	13	4

WEST

WEST FLORIDA.

Expences incurred in the Province within the Period abovementioned.

Bills drawn by the governor	—	—	15,400	0	0
Bills drawn by the commander in chief	—	—	83,300	0	0
Provisions, and charges of freight	—	—	1,082,700	0	0
Indian presents	—	—	20,000	0	0
Civil establishment	—	—	12,850	0	0
Amount of three years	—	—	1214,250	0	0
Annual average	—	—	£. 404,750	0	0

Annual average of East-Florida	—	122,660	13	4
Ditto . . . of West-Florida	—	404,750	0	0
		£. 527,416	13	4

No part of the military establishment is included in the above.

FLORIDA

FLORIDA Imports and Exports for several distinct Years.

	Imports. £.	Exports. £.	Imports Excess. £.	Exports Excess. £.
In 1763	—	9,946	—	9,946
1768	—	32,572	—	18,493
1773	—	51,502	—	44,378
1778	—	64,165	—	15,929
1781	—	16,446	14,268	—
				...

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX, No. IV.

STATE of the BRITISH FLEET,

31st December, 1782.

<i>Jamaica</i> —of the line	—	—	4
Two supposed coming home.			
One (Monarch) in bad condition, having been on shore.			
<i>Leeward Islands</i> —of the line	—		40
The Prudent at St. Lucia excepted.			
<i>North America</i> —of the line	—	—	1
Of 50 guns	—	3.	
<i>East Indies</i> —of the line, and on their passage, including Com. Bickerton's squadron			18
Returned to Europe	—		1
Of 50 guns	—	3.	
<i>Home Service</i> —of the line, Vigilant and Standard inclusive			16
<i>Fitting out</i> —of the line, that would be ready by the end of April,			6
<i>Designed for Foreign Service.</i>			
For West Indies under Com. Elliot	—		6
For East Indies, viz. Fortitude, Alexander, and Egmont	—		3
For West India Convoy	—		2
Ditto, (with Troops for Jamaica, viz. 2 Regiments) Atlas and Vengeance			2
			99

N. B. The ships that were to have been paid off are not included in these numbers.—Three or four of fifty guns (and Medway for St. Helena) were reserved for occasional services.—The receiving ships, Diligente, Dunkirk, and Lenox, exclusive also.

COMBINED and FOREIGN FORCE.

<i>At Cadiz</i> —of the line	—	60
Captain Bourmaster's intelligence confirming that of captur'd Master of Gibraltar Transport.		
American Squadron—Vaudreuil	—	12
<i>Havana</i> —ready	—	8
<i>East Indies</i>	—	18
Upon their passage thither, as by intelligence—supposed	—	4
Fitting out at Brest, Toulon, and Ferrol—suppose	—	6
N. B. Inferred, <i>at least</i> , equal in number to those we had fitting in our ports.		
Total		108

<i>Dutch</i> —estimated in the whole at 20 of the line.		
At the Texel—supposed	—	16
Fourteen were actually at sea, supposed of convoy.		
<i>United States of America</i> —no positive number: but of a class that would require some force at New York.		
Total		124

If the Dutch be reckoned at 20, — Total 128

APPEN.

APPENDIX, No. V.

*The State of the FRENCH NAVAL
FORCE in actual Service.*

In October 1782, it amounted to —	73
Deduct the Solitaire,—since taken —	72
A list of the Spanish navy, which ap- pears very much under the mark, amounts to — — —	58
Ditto of the Dutch, including fifty-gun ships, amounts to — — —	19
	149
The number of line of battle ships build- ing in France, to be launched early in 1783, amounts to — — —	6
By other intelligence — — —	19

NOTE, Page 72.

“ The authentic chart of the Newfoundland coast, is
“ that by James Cook and Michael Lane;—the
“ greater part of the others giving false ideas of the
“ distance between Cape Bonavista and Cape St. John.”

F I N I S.

L

72

58

19

49

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19

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